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INTRODUCTION 
The dominant narrative about changes in financial technology—or 
“fintech” in today’s gushing parlance—is that the financial services 
industry is undergoing nothing short of a revolution.1  No part of the 
financial sector has a better claim to that revolution narrative than 
payment services, which every year move more than a quadrillion—or 
one thousand trillion—U.S. dollars globally2 and more than 175 trillion 
U.S. dollars in the United States alone.3 
In the last two decades, payments have moved away from cash, 
paper checks, and other relatively slow and expensive mechanisms to 
incrementally faster and cheaper digital payment services.  Digital 
payments now account for more than 80 percent of all U.S. consumer 
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 1.   See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Where Finance and Technology Come Together, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/business/dealbook/where-finance-and-
technology-come-together.html [https://perma.cc/ZR6M-8LU5] (cataloguing fintech companies’ 
assessments of their own potential).  Most definitions of “fintech” in use today focus on the 
commercialization of new technology to a degree noticeable in the market.  See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY 
BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH 7 (2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BJP-7WWN] (defining “fintech” as a “technology-
enabled innovation in financial services that could result in new business models, applications, 
processes[,] or products with an associated material effect on the provision of financial services”). 
 2.   See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-614, PAYMENT SERVICES: FEDERAL 
RESERVE’S COMPETITION WITH OTHER PROVIDERS BENEFITS CUSTOMERS, BUT ADDITIONAL 
REVIEWS COULD INCREASE ASSURANCE OF COST ACCURACY 1 (2016), https://www.gao.gov 
/assets/680/679388.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2LZ-THPD] (noting the value for the year 2015). 
 3.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, THE U.S. PATH TO FASTER PAYMENTS: FINAL 
REPORT PART ONE: THE FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE APPROACH 16 (2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/US-path-to-faster-payments-pt1-201701.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MPA7-DUFU]. 
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purchases of goods and services and nearly 100 percent of all other 
commercial transactions.4  They are essential to the efficient functioning 
of markets and the real economy5 and continued U.S. economic 
competitiveness.6  Given this importance, state and federal regulators 
have created a well-established framework over the last several decades 
to protect consumers from unfair practices and unauthorized transactions, 
to prevent criminals and terrorists from using payment services, and to 
preserve the safety and soundness of the larger financial system.7 
A common corollary to the revolution narrative is that financial 
change—both change in the technologies and change in the business 
models of financial services companies—will require a broad rethinking 
of financial regulation.  According to this corollary, a failure of financial 
regulators to adapt to these developments will reduce the 
competitiveness of domestic financial services firms, hinder efforts to 
increase basic access to financial services, and even undermine their own 
regulatory objectives.8 
This Article challenges that logic as it applies to payment services.  
The motivating insight here is that payments regulation is largely 
technology-neutral and activity-based and thus readily capable of 
                                                            
 4.   See FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 3 (2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2016-payments-study-20161222.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/TDQ5-TUMZ] (noting nearly $150 trillion in digital payments and $26.83 trillion in 
paper checks in 2015).  The use of paper checks (by number) peaked in the mid-1990s.  See id. at 4. 
 5.   See Marc Rysman & Scott Schuh, New Innovations in Payments, 17 INNOVATION POL’Y & 
ECON. 27, 27 (2017). 
 6.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT PART TWO: A CALL TO ACTION 3 
(2017), https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/faster-payments-task-force-final-
report-part-two.pdf [https://perma.cc/G63Y-7RNE] (“The payment system is critical to the economic 
vitality and competitiveness of the United States and must continually evolve to meet the needs of an 
economy that is becoming more global, digitally-interconnected, real-time and information-
driven.”); see also COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
INNOVATIONS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS 24 (2012) [hereinafter BIS/CPSS, INNOVATIONS IN RETAIL 
PAYMENTS], https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d102.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6AZ-UBSX] (reporting the 
results of studies showing potential gains in a country’s annual GDP between one-quarter of one 
percent and one percent). 
 7.   See infra Part III. 
 8.   See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER & DANIEL GORFINE, CTR. FOR FIN. MKTS., MILKEN INST., 
FINTECH: BUILDING A 21ST-CENTURY REGULATOR’S TOOLKIT 1 (2014), https://assets1b.milken 
institute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/3.14-FinTech-Reg-Toolkit-NEW.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/UBX3-JV2N] (arguing that “the rise of FinTech challenges underlying precepts of existing 
regulatory approaches and requires fresh thinking as to how regulation can best foster the 
responsible development of this industry” and “outlin[ing] characteristics of FinTech that drive the 
need for new thinking about today’s regulatory approaches”); id. (“A failure to account for these 
trends will result in regulatory frameworks that fall short of their goals, impede positive innovation, 
and reduce competitiveness of local economies and businesses.”); id. at 14 (“The novel features of 
FinTech innovation will . . . . . . require a re-thinking of how we approach regulation and the 
processes we apply to rulemaking.”). 
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adapting to financial change.  The Article constructs a stylized model—
the “payment stack”—to place incumbents, sources of financial change, 
and regulatory objectives together in context.  The model sorts all 
payment services into seven categories based on their function within the 
larger payments ecosystem.  Relying on this model, the Article concludes 
that services within each category are subject to roughly equivalent 
regulation (or subject to no payments regulation), irrespective of the 
underlying technology or choice of business strategy.9  Because that 
regulation maps onto the underlying economic functions of payment 
services, it is largely technology-neutral and activity-based, making it 
less time-dependent and more durable in the face of industry 
innovation.10 
This Article constructs and operationalizes the payment stack model 
in five parts.  Part I briefly outlines the functions of payment services and 
the core objectives of current U.S. payments regulation.11  Given the 
considerable heterogeneity in payments markets and regulation across 
the globe, this Article does not seek to apply the model outside of the 
United States. 
Part II sorts the activities that make up the payments ecosystem into 
layers according to their functions and interdependencies in a payment 
transaction.  In sorting services according to their functions and 
interdependencies, the payment stack model borrows from two distinct 
sources.  The first source is the concept of a “stack”: a modeling method 
                                                            
 9.   Others have made related arguments about the activity-based nature of certain aspects of 
financial regulation as applied to certain technologies.  See, e.g., Mills et al., Distributed Ledger 
Technology in Payments, Clearing, and Settlement 27–28 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. and Econ. 
Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2016-095, 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016095pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2NL-
KFLH] (“The relevant laws, regulations, and supervisory policies [with respect to distributed ledger 
technology] are aimed at achieving broad objectives such as market transparency, safety and 
soundness of financial institutions, and the efficient and effective functioning of the broader 
financial system, and are not generally intended to favor a particular electronic technology.”); Larry 
D. Wall, Avoiding Regulation: FinTech Versus the Sharing Economy, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA 
(Sept. 2016), https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/09-avoiding-
regulation-fintech-versus-the-sharing-economy-2016-09-29.aspx [https://perma.cc/BN8R-CMXJ] 
(“[M]any of these [financial regulation] rules are written so they cover not only banks and other 
traditional financial firms but would also cover fintech firms.”).  This is a point that many fintech 
firms often use to counter assertions that they are unregulated under current regimes.  See, e.g., Jerry 
Brito, Is Bitcoin Regulated?, COIN CTR. (Jan. 13, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/is-bitcoin-
regulated [https://perma.cc/6HYS-8V57]. 
 10.   See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2016). 
 11.   See generally COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS (2014) [hereinafter BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN 
RETAIL PAYMENTS], https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d118.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMJ9-M3ZL]. 
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to create visual relationships among dependent elements of a system.  
The original stack model—the “internet protocol stack”—showed how 
various internet protocols built on one another so that hardware and 
software can communicate in ways that are intuitive to humans.12  The 
second source for the payment stack model is the longstanding 
observation in legal scholarship that a focus on the functions of regulated 
activities—who provides a service, to whom, and how, for example—is 
essential to understanding the relationship between regulation and a 
rapidly changing system.13 
Relying on this functional stack model, Part III describes the existing 
scope of regulation that applies to activities in each layer of the stack and 
assesses the degree to which that regulation is technology-neutral and 
activity-based.  Regulation that follows such an approach, by seeking to 
regulate similar risks in a similar manner, not only allows regulators to 
adapt more quickly to new challenges, even in times of immense change, 
but also enhances predictability, assures market participants and their 
customers that regulators are focused on risk rather than extraneous 
considerations, reduces incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage, and 
provides a level regulatory playing field.14 
The model constructed here demonstrates that payments activities 
                                                            
 12.  Henrik Frystyk, The Internet Protocol Stack, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (July 
1994), https://www.w3.org/People/Frystyk/thesis/TcpIp.html [https://perma.cc/Y8XS-DXXQ]. 
 13.  See Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 1444; Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual 
Framework for Analyzing the Financial Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A 
FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 6, 10–11 (Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 1995). 
 14.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL DESIGNATIONS 
9 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/PM-FSOC-Designations-
Memo-11-17.pdf https://perma.cc/HBZ2-TVUD] (“Firms engaged in the same activity should be 
treated uniformly based on how the activity may contribute to risk.  Failure to do so could distort 
free markets.”); FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 2–3 (“Regulators should be agile when there is 
a need to respond to fast changes in the FinTech space.  This may be more easily and efficiently 
achieved with an approach that is neutral with regard to technologies and based on financial service 
activities.”); C. Andrew Gerlach et al., U.S. Regulation of FinTech – Recent Developments and 
Challenges, 44 CAPCO INST. J.  FIN. TRANSFORMATION 87, 90 (2016) (“By seeking to ensure that 
comparable financial products and services are regulated similarly, regardless of the nature of the 
provider, regulators seek to minimize the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage.”); BIS/CPSS, 
INNOVATIONS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 6, at 55 (“At the same time, a balanced regulatory 
approach is necessary to prevent inconsistencies between regulatory requirements already 
established for different providers and industrial sectors.  Furthermore, a level playing field for 
banks and non-bank providers is essential to avoid competitive distortions.”); see also Comments of 
Funding Circle on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Proposal for Special Purpose 
National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies 3 (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-funding-circle.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LG2A-NEB8] (“Regulatory parity among companies, new and incumbent, that 
engage in the same business activities is not only a matter of fairness, but also drives more market 
participants to operate under the same rulebook.”). 
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within each stack layer are subject to roughly equivalent regulation, 
irrespective of the type of technology or business model involved.  And 
many payment activities subject to a significant degree of financial 
change do not pose payment-specific risks and are thus subject to only 
limited regulation in the first place.  This suggests that financial change 
will not demand wholesale changes to payments regulation, defying 
today’s prevailing narrative about financial services in general. 
But that is not to say that payments regulation should be static.  
Because the basic structure of existing approaches is relatively durable, 
as outlined in Part IV, payments regulators have the opportunity to 
follow a nuanced, fact-specific approach rather than a broad agenda of 
reform.  In response to some forms of financial change, regulators may 
need simply to make explicit that existing regulation applies to that 
change.  Other forms of financial change might provide regulators with 
an opportunity to correct the limited aspects of payments regulation that 
are not entirely neutral with respect to technology or business model.  
And with yet other forms of financial change, regulators may need to 
take further steps, including in circumstances in which regulation 
becomes obsolete in the future due to forms of “payment stack collapse,” 
the fragmented nature of the payments market impedes market-based 
improvements, change results in an activity that is inherently low-risk, or 
change actually improves the ability of regulators to achieve their 
objectives.   
I. ESSENTIALS OF PAYMENT SERVICES AND THEIR REGULATION 
Before constructing the payment stack model, it is useful to outline 
the basic utility of payment services—what they do and why—and the 
core objectives of payments regulation. 
A. The Utility of Payment Services 
In theory, the U.S. economy could function without digital payment 
services.  There is no absolute need for them, and there are other ways of 
moving wealth around the economy.  Consumers and businesses could, 
for example, use physical cash to pay for everything.15  Cash is 
convenient in many ways: when a consumer pays with cash, the 
merchant receives final payment in a form that it can immediately use to 
                                                            
 15.   Although not typically considered a payment service in legal scholarship, the production, 
distribution, and redemption of physical payment instruments, including cash, is in some limited 
senses a government-supplied payment service. 
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make payments of its own, without further processing, transformation, or 
recording of the transaction.16  But cash is difficult to carry around in 
large amounts and to use securely, and consumers, businesses, and 
regulators may prefer that a transaction generate a record that proves the 
payment was made.17  Digital payments reduce these frictions inherent to 
economic transactions and, by moving money more efficiently than 
physical cash, improve the functioning of the real economy. 
Three characteristics define the current digital payments market in 
the United States in ways that may affect the nature and degree of 
financial change in the market.  The first characteristic is that the U.S. 
payments market is relatively saturated, with an established set of 
incumbent services and providers.  Incumbency in the payments market 
matters to a large degree because every payment service must, either 
alone or together with other payment services, operate as a multisided 
platform that is capable of matching payment senders with payment 
recipients.18  Through this matchmaking function, a payment service 
connects consumers with merchants (person-to-business or business-to-
person payments, usually in connection with the exchange of goods or 
services), individuals with other individuals (peer-to-peer payments), or 
businesses with other businesses (business-to-business payments). 
Today’s incumbents enjoy a large network of participants—
consumers, merchants, and banks, for example—that provides a number 
of key advantages.  These include supply-side advantages due to 
economies of scale (so that the average cost of providing payment 
services falls as they provide more services) and demand-side advantages 
due to an existing critical mass of end-users (so that the addition of each 
new end-user increases the utility of the network for all users and 
provides incentives for more consumers and merchants to also join the 
network).19  Incumbents have cemented these advantages through a 
complex network of contracts among participants and shared 
                                                            
 16.   RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 3–4 (6th 
ed. 2016). 
 17.   Id. at 4. 
 18.   See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS 
OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 1–2, 149–64 (2016).  A person or entity that is owed money is 
sometimes called a “payer,” while a person or entity that is owed money is sometimes called a 
“payee.”  Either a payer or a payee may initiate payments, but those terms are not intuitive, so this 
Article will simplify by referring to payment senders and recipients. 
 19.   See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 492–95, 512–15 (1998).  Network effects in payment messaging 
services are well-documented.  See, e.g., BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 
11, at 14; Ronald J. Mann, A Requiem for Sam’s Bank, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 968 (2008). 
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technological standards.20  New entrants thus face the significant 
challenge, at a very early stage, of drawing consumers, merchants, and 
banks away from existing players to achieve their own economies of 
scale and critical mass of end-users before incumbents are able to 
develop or acquire a competing technology or business model.21 
The second defining characteristic of the U.S. payments market is 
that it is bank-centric.  Banks—entities whose primary business involves 
commercial lending from demand deposits22—have historically 
dominated the market, which is a relatively mature one, with relatively 
high levels of financial inclusion and a deep bench of incumbent 
providers.23  This dominance is partly a function of the relationships 
between banks and their commercial and investment clients, which 
account for the vast majority of payments volume.  Although banks have 
also enjoyed extensive relationships with consumer clients, the market 
has remained susceptible to competition in consumer payments from a 
broad range of new technologies and business models.  Changes in 
technology and business model have led to a proliferation of nonbank 
payment providers—including some of the largest companies in the 
world—which have improved the efficiency, security, and convenience 
of retail payment services, lowering transaction costs and making 
economic activity in all sectors more efficient.24  At the same time, 
nonbanks must still rely on banks for access to the underlying payments 
infrastructure that the Federal Reserve and the largest banks operate. 
The third key characteristic of the U.S. payments market is that it is 
account-based, in that payment senders and recipients must have an 
account that holds funds in order to access payment services.  Account-
based digital payments depend necessarily on the maintenance of a 
payment account at a bank or other account provider and that provider’s 
ability to verify the identity of the account holder.  By contrast, token-
                                                            
 20.   See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 19, at 492–94. 
 21.   See id. at 492–95; see also FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 4 (noting that “network 
effects and economies of scale and scope could foster greater concentration” in financial services). 
 22.   This functional definition is reflected in the definition of “bank” in U.S. statutes, which 
also includes any institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and provides for a 
number of categorical exclusions.  12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2012).  It is also the most common 
functional definition used in international regulatory forums.  See, e.g., BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN 
RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 11, at 27.  Bank holding companies (as well as nonbanks) may in 
some circumstances own entities that provide payment services and do not fit within this functional 
definition (e.g., specialty credit card banks).  See Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That 
Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulations in the United 
States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 170 (2012). 
 23.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 4. 
 24.   See BIS/CPSS, INNOVATIONS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 6, at 7, 15, 20. 
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based payments, such as bitcoin and other services that rely on 
distributed ledger technology, do not require any contemporaneous 
account verification or a network of account providers. 
Each of these characteristics affects both the opportunities available 
to market participants when implementing financial change in payment 
services and the choices available to regulators in addressing that change. 
B. Objectives of Payment Services Regulation 
Before modeling the details of payments regulation and the possible 
consequences of financial change, it is critical to understand the core 
objectives behind government intervention in the payments market.  
Financial regulators have long concerned themselves with the safe and 
efficient functioning of payment services given their key role in the 
financial system and the real economy.25  In its current form, U.S. 
payments regulation serves three core objectives.  The first objective is 
the protection of individual consumers from unfair business practices or 
losses due to unauthorized transactions or errors.  Regulators seek to 
achieve this “consumer protection” objective through rules governing 
risk allocation in individual transactions, financial requirements placed 
on nonbanks that provide certain consumer services, and the underlying 
bank regulatory regime.26 
The second objective is to prevent criminals and terrorists from using 
payment services to further their illegal activities.27  The core of this law 
enforcement regime in the United States is the Bank Secrecy Act,28 
originally enacted in 1970, which imposes customer due diligence, 
reporting, and monitoring obligations, among other requirements.29  As 
with consumer protection, regulators seek to achieve this objective both 
through rules applicable to nonbanks and through the underlying bank 
regulatory regime. 
The third and final objective is financial stability—ensuring the 
                                                            
 25.   See BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 11, at 1. 
 26.   See infra Part III. 
 27.   This Article will not separately address U.S. sanctions programs—which prohibit 
unlicensed transactions with designated entities—because they serve objectives beyond the 
traditional framework of financial regulation.  To the extent that sanctions serve the financial 
regulatory objectives that are addressed in this Article, the other law enforcement regulations 
discussed here serve as useful proxies for understanding those objectives.  See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 
560.530(a)(3) (2017) (describing certain U.S. sanctions programs). 
 28.   Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–59; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314, 5316–32 
(2012). 
 29.   See infra Section III.C. 
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safety and soundness of individual payment providers and payment 
networks, and the stability of the overall financial system.30  Payment 
services companies may transmit risks because they engage as a conduit 
for activities that affect other participants in the financial system.31  A 
financial institution that is unable to fund a payment will transmit risk to 
any other institution that expected payments from it over the course of 
the day and to any settlement service provider that extended credit to 
participants, and ultimately those problems may be transmitted to the real 
economy.32 
The chief financial stability risks associated with payment systems 
are liquidity risk (the risk that a participant in the system will be unable 
to meet its obligations when due), credit risk (the risk that a system 
participant will be unable to meet its obligations at any time in the 
future), and operational risk (the risk that deficiencies, errors, failures, or 
disruptions in the hardware or software of a digital payment system will 
result in the reduced efficiency, security, or availability of the system’s 
services).33  Because banks play a central role in the payments market 
today, regulators primarily rely on the underlying regime of banking 
regulation and supervision to achieve this objective, although the U.S. 
government reduces liquidity and credit risks associated with settlement 
by operating its own systems and by applying specific rules to certain 
privately operated payment infrastructures.34 
II. THE PAYMENT STACK: A FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF PAYMENT 
SERVICES 
To better understand the potential effects of financial change on 
payments regulation, the payment stack model reduces the thousands of 
payment services and providers into seven stylized categories.  The 
model is both activity-based, in the sense that it sorts payment services 
according to their function in moving wealth around the economy, and 
technology-and-business-model-neutral, in that the model does not take 
into account the particulars of the hardware or software enabling a 
payment service or the strategic choices and structure of the service 
                                                            
 30.   See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 17–21. 
 31.   See Mann, supra note 19, at 965. 
 32.   See id. at 966–67. 
 33.   See FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ON PAYMENT SYSTEM RISK 4–5 
(2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
B2XZ-J7N9].  
 34.   See infra Sections III.D, III.F. 
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provider.  Such a model can facilitate the analysis of systems that are 
subject to fast-paced changes but that depend on relatively static and 
familiar activities—in this case, the movement of wealth around the 
economy.35  This coincides with analytical frameworks in other 
disciplines, including engineering and economics, which focus on the 
inputs and outcomes of a system, without concern for the system’s 
internal complexity.36 
The model also blends two distinct categories of payment services.  
The first category is retail payments, which are relatively low-value 
payments, most often between two individuals or an individual and a 
business.37  The second category is wholesale payments, which are 
relatively high-value payments, most often between two businesses.38  
Because many retail payments are eventually settled on wholesale 
payment systems, it is important to understand the interplay between 
these two types of payments.  The model, at the same time, takes into 
account potential differences between retail and wholesale payments that 
may affect regulatory responses to financial change. 
As shown in Figure 1, the resulting payment stack model consists of 
six interdependent service categories—platform, processing, payment 
account, connection, messaging, and settlement services—and a seventh, 
standalone category, end-to-end services, which generally provide all 
functions necessary to complete a payment transaction.  There are many 
other models that show the flow of digital messages from service 
provider to service provider.  The payment stack model does not attempt 
to describe the specific messages that may be sent from a provider in one 
service category to a provider in another.  The model is instead roughly 
organized according to the arc of most transactions, beginning at the top 
with the perspective of a typical individual or business end-user, and 
moving down through the underlying processes, invisible to most end-
users, that drive the transaction. 
                                                            
 35.   See Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 1445; Merton & Bodie, supra note 13, at 6, 10–11. 
 36.   See Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 1445 (noting that this is known as a “black-box” analysis 
in engineering disciplines); Merton & Bodie, supra note 13, at 10–11 (noting that economists refer 
to this analysis as a “functional perspective”). 
 37.   See generally infra Part II. 
 38.   See generally id. 
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Figure 1: Payment Stack Model 
Each service category serves an essential function in a payment 
transaction: (1) platform services allow end-users to initiate payment 
transactions; (2) processing services perform the complex information 
technology functions underlying payments; (3) account services hold 
funds on behalf of payment senders and recipients; (4) connection 
services provide  relationships with banks and access to settlement 
infrastructure; (5) messaging services enable payment senders to 
communicate with payment recipients; and (6) settlement services effect 
the actual transfer of funds from the payment recipient to the payment 
sender.39  Each of the seven categories of services in the payment stack 
39. In more classical terms, digital payments typically involve five basic steps: (1) submission,
(2) validation, (3) conditionality, (4) clearing, and (5) settlement.  See Mills et al., supra note 9, at 5
& n.8.  To send or receive funds, a payment message is submitted or sent across the payment system
and then validated or authenticated, which might involve verification of the sender’s identity and the
integrity of the message.  See id. at 5.  If the payment message is validated, the system determines
whether the payment meets the conditions for settlement, generally the availability of sufficient
funds or credit.  See id.  Clearing readies the payment for settlement and involves the exchange of
payment information between the service providers of the payment sender and the payment
recipient, in some cases the batching and netting of multiple payments, and the establishment of final
positions for settlement.  See COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT 10
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model are described in further detail below. 
A. Platform Services
Services in the first layer of the payment stack—consumer platform
services—enable individual consumers, through physical devices or 
software, to initiate a payment transaction and to access funds or credit in 
their payment accounts, in the third layer of the payment stack.40  
Physical payment cards—credit, debit, and prepaid cards—have been for 
many years the most popular consumer platforms for paying for goods 
and services in the United States.  Payment cards include credit cards 
(providing access to revolving credit accounts), debit cards (providing 
access to funds in bank accounts), and prepaid cards (providing access to 
funds previously provided to the issuer but without a permanent 
account).41 
Today, wallet services offered through Apple Pay, PayPal, Venmo, 
and Zelle also allow consumers to store payment account information—
the details from physical payment cards, bank and other account 
information, or, increasingly, randomly generated numbers (or “tokens”) 
that replace those details—in a payment “wallet.”42  These wallet 
services are used either to pay merchants for goods and services or to 
make person-to-person payments.43 
To pay for goods or services, a consumer initiates a transaction on a 
consumer platform, which communicates with a processing service 
(2017) [hereinafter BIS/CPMI, LEDGER TECHNOLOGY], https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d157.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N6Y-3CQL].  Settlement occurs once the ledger of the settlement service 
provider is updated and the recipient’s service provider is credited.  See Mills et al., supra note 9, at 
5–7, 13. 
40. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-361, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY:
INFORMATION ON SUBSECTORS AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 18–19 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/690/684187.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2PU-6VLD]; EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 
157. 
41. See MANN, supra note 16, at 11, 61, 79.
42. See, e.g., Apple Pay Security and Privacy Overview, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT203027 [https://perma.cc/D8JR-N46R] (explaining that, when using Apple Pay, “your bank, 
your bank’s authorized service provider, or your card issuer creates a device-specific Device 
Account Number, encrypts it, and sends it along with other data (such as the key used to generate 
dynamic security codes that are unique to each transaction) to Apple”); Peter Rudegeair, Why Apple 
and J.P. Morgan Are Chasing Venmo, WALL ST. J.  (June 26, 2017, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-apple-and-j-p-morgan-are-chasing-venmo-1498469401 
(describing competition among wallet providers such as Apple Pay, Venmo, PayPal, and Zelle). 
43. See MARIANNE CROWE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA & FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF BOS., IS PAYMENT TOKENIZATION READY FOR PRIMETIME? 9 & n.20 (2015), 
https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/PaymentStrategies/tokenization-prime-time.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JUM3-UKDD]. 
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provider in the second layer of the payment stack that has contracted 
with the merchant to assist in receiving payments.44  To initiate an in-
person transaction, a consumer swipes the magnetic strip or inserts the 
chip of a payment card, or uses contactless technology embedded within 
a payment card or mobile phone.45 
For an internet or other remote transaction—where the consumer is 
not physically present at the merchant’s store—a consumer inputs the 
details of the payment card or relies on previously stored payment details 
in a payment wallet.46  For some mobile and internet transactions, such 
as those involving ride-sharing services like Uber and Lyft, there is no 
distinct moment of payment because logging into the platform serves as 
authorization for any goods or services ordered on it.47  In that way, 
digital wallets have made the mechanics of payments less visible to 
consumers.48 
The consumer platform and merchant processor usually work 
together to encrypt the payment details or replace sensitive payment card 
information at the time of payment initiation with dynamically-created 
tokens.49  The platforms then submit the payment details or token to a 
processing service provider in the second layer of the payment stack, 
without any further involvement, except to receive a notification as to 
whether the transaction was successful.50 
B. Processing Services 
Because digital payments require an enormous amount of technical 
expertise and computing storage and processing capacity,51  most 
merchants as well as most payment providers in other payment stack 
                                                            
 44.   See First Data Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7–8 (Feb. 24, 2017) [hereinafter First 
Data Corp., Form 10-K], https://investor.firstdata.com/~/media/Files/F/FirstData-IR/documents/ 
2016-form-10-k.pdf. 
 45.   See, e.g., id. at 4, 7–8 (describing the general methods for conducting in-person payment 
card, internet, and mobile transactions).   
 46.   See id. 
 47.   See WORLD ECON. FORUM, BEYOND FINTECH: A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF 
DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 36–39 (2017), http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/Beyond_Fintech_- _A_Pragmatic_Assessment_of_Disruptive_Potential_in_Financial_Services 
.pdf. 
 48.   See id. 
 49.   See CROWE ET AL., supra note 43, at 16 (describing the tokenization process in the context 
of mobile wallets). 
 50.   See Dwolla Terms of Service, DWOLLA (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.dwolla.com/legal/tos/ 
[https://perma.cc/U6RV-LTB4] (explaining that Dwolla’s partner banks carry out the remainder of 
the transaction process using messaging and settlement services). 
 51.   See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 1, 19, 27, 30. 
96 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
layers contract with third-parties that provide a broad range of payment-
related “back-end” processing services.52  Even in circumstances where 
companies provide services to both consumers and businesses, it is the 
business that typically pays for the processing service, with the processor 
acting as the agent or affiliate of an account service provider in the third 
layer of the payment stack or as the agent of a merchant.53 
Processing services include merchant processors, which enable 
merchants to receive payments by offering software, hardware, and 
processing services that allow merchants to communicate with consumer 
platforms in the first layer and accept internet payments or in-person 
payments.54  They also include services to payment account providers in 
the third layer of the payment stack, sending and receiving payment 
messages on their behalf to other layers of the payment stack, including 
messaging networks and settlement systems,55 and managing customer 
billing and other communications.56 
Some companies, including PayPal, Square,57 and Dwolla,58 provide 
both consumer platform services and business processing services.  Other 
merchant processors, including incumbents, like First Data, Vantiv,59 and 
Authorize.net (a Visa subsidiary),60 and newer entrants, like Braintree (a 
PayPal subsidiary)61 and Alkami,62 focus on the merchant side of the 
                                                            
 52.   See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK: RETAIL 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 19–20 (2016) [hereinafter FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK], 
https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/274860/ffiec_itbooklet_retailpaymentsystems.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/2NBQ-D8ZG]. 
 53.   See infra Section III.C.1 (describing the exceptions to money transmitter regulation).  
Dwolla, for example, operates as an agent of its partner banks, allowing it to operate, for regulatory 
purposes, as a platform service, rather than an account service.  See About Our Financial Institution 
Partners, DWOLLA, https://www.dwolla.com/legal/about-our-financial-institution-partner/ 
[https://perma.cc/E7EB-TG4S] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 54.   See, e.g., Square, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4 (Feb. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Square, 
Form 10-K], https://s21.q4cdn.com/114365585/files/doc_financials/2016/q4/Square_10K_2016.pdf. 
 55.   See Debit and Credit Card Processing Solutions, FIRST DATA, https://www.firstdata.com 
/en_us/products/global-and-national-financial-institutions/credit-and-debit-processing-solutions.html 
[https://perma.cc/QA4X-GVBN] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018); Credit and Debit Card Solutions, FIRST 
DATA, https://www.firstdata.com/en_us/products/merchants/card-and-check-acceptance.html 
[https://perma.cc/VG74-Q7PT] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 56.   See Customer Communications Solutions, FIRST DATA, https://www.firstdata.com/en_us 
/products/global-and-national-financial-institutions/customer-communications-solutions.html 
[https://perma.cc/AM68-CTER] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 57.   See Square, Form 10-K, supra note 54, at 4. 
 58.   See Dwolla Terms of Service, DWOLLA, (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.dwolla.com/ 
legal/tos/ [https://perma.cc/CL47-6B8N]. 
 59.   See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 157. 
 60.   How Payments Work, AUTHORIZE.NET, https://www.authorize.net/resources/how-
payments-work/ [https://perma.cc/JW2Y-2QXV] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 61.   Get Started – Overview, BRAINTREE, https://articles.braintreepayments.com/get-
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transaction.  Still others serve niche payments markets, such as payments 
platform and processing for particular types of merchants.63 
Companies need not specialize in payment services to provide vital 
infrastructure to the payments ecosystem.  Financial services generally, 
and payment services in particular, are increasingly dependent on large 
technology companies to provide important informational technology 
infrastructure.64  Cloud service providers such as Amazon Web 
Services,65 Microsoft Azure,66 and Google Cloud Platform67 provide data 
storage and processing infrastructure and cybersecurity and business 
continuity services to payments companies in all layers of the payment 
stack.  These cloud platforms also provide access to ecosystems of data 
management and analytic services, including artificial intelligence and 
customer data collection and analysis services, supplied by software 
companies like IBM68 and Salesforce.69 
By outsourcing these resource-intensive technology services, account 
providers and merchants can focus on implementing their core business 
models.70  As part of a larger trend to outsource technology-related 
functions in financial services, all but the largest banks are increasingly 
                                                            
started/overview [https://perma.cc/GK2S-DNTT] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 62.   Solutions – Intuition Meets Innovation, ALKAMI, https://www.alkami.com/features 
[https://perma.cc/T6BN-DAW3] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018); Katie Roof, Alkami Raises $70 Million 
for Mobile Banking Software, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 9, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2018/01/09/alkami-raises-70-million-for-mobile-banking-software/ [https://perma.cc/77T8-6GKK]. 
 63.   See, e.g., Message from the CEO, AFFINIPAY, https://affinipay.com/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/W252-66XM] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 64.   WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 47, at 27 (“Financial institutions of all sizes are 
increasingly dependent on large techs’ cloud based infrastructure to scale and deploy processes and 
to harness artificial intelligence (AI) as a service.”). 
 65.   See Banking & Payments, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/financial-
services/banking/ [https://perma.cc/8N34-TB4Q] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 66.   See Azure SaaS Applications for Financial Services, MICROSOFT AZURE, 
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/industries/financial/ [https://perma.cc/Z882-XNCX] (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2018).  
 67.   See Financial Services Solutions, GOOGLE CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/solutions/f 
inancial-services/ [https://perma.cc/V67M-C8TV] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 68.   Front Office Banking Is Leading Modernization of the Financial Services Industry, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/industries/banking-financial-markets/front-office/ [https://perma.cc/8RT7-
WY4H] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 69.   See CRM 101: What is CRM?, SALESFORCE, https://www.salesforce.com/crm/what-is-
crm/ [https://perma.cc/5Y7P-2SYC] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 70.   See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, RISK MANAGEMENT OF OUTSOURCED 
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES 1 (2000), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2000 
/sr0017a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQN3-RASH] (“[O]utsourcing to affiliated or nonaffiliated entities 
can help financial institutions manage costs, obtain necessary expertise, expand customer product 
offerings, and improve services . . . .”). 
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outsourcing processing activities to nonbanks.71  Banks generally 
outsource these services when specialized companies have a comparative 
advantage due to expertise or economies of scale.72  This can reduce 
operating costs and avoid large, fixed-cost investments in processing 
technology.73 
C. Account Services 
The third layer of the payment stack consists of payment account 
services that are provided directly to consumers and businesses, allowing 
them to use a deposit or other account to fund or receive payments.  
Consumers access their payment accounts through a consumer platform 
service in the first layer of the payment stack; merchants and other 
businesses access their accounts through a processing service in the 
second layer.  Payment account providers rely on connection services in 
the fourth layer of the payment stack to connect to the underlying 
payments infrastructure, messaging and settlement services in the fifth 
and sixth layers.  Payment account holders can use their accounts to 
make either retail or wholesale payments, as described in further detail 
below. 
1. Retail Payment Accounts 
Consumers can make retail payments from three basic types of 
accounts: deposit or other demand accounts, revolving credit lines, and 
prepaid balances.  Payments from these accounts are made through 
payment card transactions, automated clearing house (“ACH”) 
transactions, or retail real-time payment (“Retail RTP”) transactions. 
A typical payment card transaction involves two account service 
providers.  The first provider, an issuer, provides consumers with a 
physical card or other payment device and commits to withdraw funds 
from the purchaser’s account (in the case of a debit or prepaid card) or to 
otherwise pay for the transaction (in the case of a credit card).74  The 
second provider, an acquirer, acting on behalf of the merchant, collects 
                                                            
 71.   See, e.g., BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 11, at 1 (noting “the 
trend for banks to outsource payments and technology-related services”); id. at 15 (“Although banks 
have outsourced specific back-end payment functions to non-banks for some time, increased 
competition and new technology have recently created more scope for such outsourcing.”). 
 72.   See id. at 15. 
 73.   See id. 
 74.   MANN, supra note 16, at 11. 
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payments from the issuer.75  As described in more detail below, payment 
card messaging services enable the issuers and acquirers to communicate 
and to calculate daily net balances owed to one another, while actual 
settlement takes place in a separate transaction using a settlement service 
in the sixth layer of the payment stack. 
ACH began as a method to make recurring payments such as utility 
bill payments and payroll deposits,76 but has more recently become an 
important payment method for the purchase of goods and services, 
especially over the internet,77 with the rise of PayPal and other nonbank 
payment account providers.78  It is by far the largest system for relatively 
low-dollar payments, processing more than 23 billion transactions worth 
over $145 trillion in payments annually.79  ACH payment transactions 
are typically completed within one or two business days. 
Retail RTP service, introduced in the United States in 2017, is 
primarily intended to provide U.S. banks and their account holders with a 
faster, near real-time method of conducting payments that would 
otherwise go through the slower ACH process.80  Its speed may also lead 
to expansion into payments that have been traditionally processed using 
wholesale real-time payment services, such as just-in-time inventory and 
other supplier payments, as well as some goods and services purchases 
over the internet.81 
Banks have historically dominated the payment account market 
because of their built-in relationships with customers who can use their 
existing checking or other demand accounts to make payments, but 
nonbanks today also allow their customers to conduct payment card, 
ACH, and RTP transactions.82  A nonbank account provider such as 
PayPal and Venmo aggregates its customer accounts in a pooled account 
held at a bank and must ultimately connect to messaging and settlement 
                                                            
 75.   See id. 
 76.   See id. at 88. 
 77.   See FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 15–16. 
 78.   See PAYPAL, PAYFLOW ACH PAYMENT SERVICE GUIDE 12, 25 (2013), 
https://www.paypalobjects.com/webstatic/en_US/developer/docs/pdf/pp_achpayment_guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CP9B-9H5X].  For transactions over the internet, PayPal’s account services allow 
merchants to initiate debits from the customer’s bank account using ACH.  See id. at 25. 
 79.   FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 4, at 2. 
 80.   See RTP: Sample Use Cases, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payme 
nt-systems/-/media/0785f93ee3534695b445dbc42a310b90.ashx [https://perma.cc/BV7W-F7DD] 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 81.   See id. 
 82.   See, e.g., First Data Corp., Form 10-K, supra note 44, at 4, 7 (describing the general 
methods for conducting such internet and mobile transactions). 
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service providers through that bank’s connection services.83 
Nonbanks whose core business is payments—like American 
Express, MoneyGram, PayPal, Square, Stripe, TransferWise, Venmo, 
and Western Union—provide payment account services, as do larger, 
more diversified nonbank companies like Google and Facebook,84 online 
merchants like Amazon, and sharing economy platforms like Airbnb.85  
Nonbank account service providers earn money by investing the balances 
of customer accounts, earning interest or other returns.86  They may also 
provide account services in order to facilitate other aspects of their 
business.  Airbnb, for example, provides account services and holds a 
guest’s payment in the guest’s account—a form of escrow—until after 
the transaction is complete.87 
2. Wholesale Payment Accounts 
Wholesale payment services (also known as large-value payment 
services) allow banks to conduct payments on their own behalf or on 
behalf of their account holders.88  These account holders include banks 
that do not have direct access to wholesale payment systems (including 
foreign banks), nonbank financial service providers holding pooled 
accounts for their own customers, commercial businesses, and individual 
consumers.89  Most of the payments made using wholesale payment 
                                                            
 83.   Richard J. Sullivan, The Federal Reserve’s Reduced Role in Retail Payments: Implications 
for Efficiency and Risk, ECON. REV., 3d Quarter 2012, at 79, 85–86, https://www 
.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/PDF/12q3Sullivan.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG3X-8RT5]. 
 84.   See, e.g., Directory of Money Transmitters, CAL. DEP’T BUS. OVERSIGHT, http://www.dbo. 
ca.gov/Licensees/money_transmitters/money_transmitters_directory.asp [https://perma.cc/64TJ-
X8ZH] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (listing these companies as licensed money transmitters under 
California law). 
 85.   See, e.g., id. 
 86.   See, e.g., Paypal User Agreement: About Your Account, PAYPAL, 
https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/ua/useragreement-full [https://perma.cc/4HUK-4GDQ] 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (“PayPal combines your PayPal balance with the PayPal balances of other 
PayPal customers and invests those funds in liquid investments in accordance with state money 
transmitter laws.  PayPal owns the interest or other earnings on these investments.”). 
 87.   See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS, 
PARTICIPANTS, AND REGULATORS 48 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents 
/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators-federal-trade-commission-
staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EE6-E9VE].  
 88.   FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 207 (2014) [hereinafter FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION 
MANUAL], https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/BSA_AML_Man_2014_v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D658-QP7J]. 
 89.   See id. at 207–08 & 208 n.203; MANN, supra note 16, at 213; FSOC Annual Report, 2012 
Fin. Stability Oversight Council 146 [hereinafter FSOC Ann. Rep.], https://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3E2-YF5T]. 
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accounts—payments related to interbank loans, real estate transactions, 
or other financial market transactions—are time-sensitive and high in 
value.90  Transactions using these systems are discussed in more detail 
below in Sections II.E.2 and II.F.2. 
D. Connection Services 
Only banks with a commercial presence in the United States may 
access U.S. messaging and settlement services in the fourth and fifth 
layers of the payment stack.  Nonbanks providing payment account 
services to consumers or businesses must as a result maintain their own 
accounts at banks to complete payment transactions.91  Connections to 
banks may also allow nonbank platform, account, and processing service 
providers to provide value-added services such as pass-through deposit 
insurance on funds held in their accounts.92  Foreign banks without a 
branch or subsidiary in the United States may access U.S. messaging and 
settlement services, either by opening an account at a correspondent bank 
(a U.S. bank that provides certain services to foreign banks) or by relying 
on cross-border arrangements that the Federal Reserve Banks have 
established with a limited number of other countries.93 
If a foreign bank has a correspondent account with a U.S. bank, it 
can use that account to make payments on its own behalf or on behalf of 
its customers and to conduct other financial activities in the United 
States.94  To complete some cross-border transactions, a chain of 
correspondent banks in multiple countries may be required, often 
resulting in the assessment of multiple fees, which are generally passed 
on to end-users.95 
The Federal Reserve Banks also provide connection services that 
                                                            
 90.   See FSOC Ann. Rep., supra note 89, at 146.  This Article classifies Fedwire as a wholesale 
payment system although one-third of Fedwire payments are less than $5,000.  See Sullivan, supra 
note 83, at 82. 
 91.   See, e.g., THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS CO. L.L.C., CHIPS RULES AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 25−26 (2013) [hereinafter CHIPS RULES], 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/files/payco%20files/rulesgov%202013%20(3).pdf?la=en 
[https://perma.cc/FPU5-K985]; THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS CO. L.L.C., ELECTRONIC 
PAYMENTS NETWORK: RULES OF MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING RULES 2 (2016); 12 C.F.R. 210.25–
210.32 (2018) (setting out operating rules for banks that participate in Fedwire). 
 92.   See, e.g., Digital Currency Balances, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/ 
legal/insurance [https://perma.cc/2ARR-AEUA] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 93.   See Heath Tarbert & Liangshun Quian, The Perils and Promise of Correspondent Banking, 
133 BANKING L.J. 53, 53 (2016). 
 94.   See id. at 55.  “Payable-through” correspondent accounts allow account holders to conduct 
payments and other banking activities directly on their own behalf.  See 31 C.F.R. § 561.307 (2017). 
 95.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 28. 
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allow U.S. banks (and their customers) to send and receive cross-border 
payments.  FedACH facilitates international ACH payments by creating 
connections with either a depository institution or a central bank-
operated transfer network in another country.96  The service is currently 
limited to Canada, Mexico, Panama, and most European countries.97 
E. Messaging Services 
The service suppliers in the first four layers allow consumers, 
merchants, and other businesses to access funds and credit lines, 
leveraging the specialized resources of technology, logistics, and 
operations companies, and relying on banks to connect them to the 
underlying payments infrastructure.  That infrastructure—consisting of 
messaging and settlement services—is what allows those connecting 
banks to communicate with one another and ultimately to transfer funds 
among themselves. 
Messaging services are responsible for the flow of payment 
instructions sent among the banks involved in a payment transaction.  
The payment instructions sent using messaging services enable the 
authorization and clearing of payment transactions and, in some cases, 
communicate the settlement instructions to be carried out by settlement 
service providers in the sixth layer of the payment stack, but they do not 
carry out the actual transfer or settlement of funds.98 
1. Retail Payment Messages 
There are three types of messaging services that relay messages 
among banks involved in retail payment transactions.  Retail messaging 
services of the first type—consumer payment card networks—process 
the vast majority of payments that consumers and business make in 
exchange for goods and services in the United States—more than 100 
billion transactions worth nearly $6 trillion.99  They send messages for 
                                                            
 96.   See FED. RESERVE BD., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF THE AUTOMATED 
CLEARINGHOUSE SYSTEM FOR REMITTANCE TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 9, 14–16 (2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/ACH_report_201107.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/DCZ7-NYEG]; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 42. 
 97.   FED. RESERVE FIN. SERVS., FEDGLOBAL ACH PAYMENTS SERVICE ORIGINATION 
MANUAL 11 (2016), https://www.frbservices.org/assets/financial-services/ach/global-service-orig-
manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDV4-6VHW]. 
 98.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 224–25.   
 99.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 53; FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 
4, at 2. 
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transactions initiated through physical payment cards (credit, debit, and 
prepaid) and wallets loaded with payment card details.100 
Modern payment cards began in the mid-twentieth century as end-to-
end services, with one company acting as the sole intermediary between 
a consumer and a merchant in a payment transaction.  These early 
payment card operations were generally regional operations: consumer 
banking was at the time disaggregated into regional fiefdoms, and 
because of the end-to-end nature of the service, cardholders were 
generally able to use their cards only at merchants that shared the same 
bank.101  That changed when the corporate predecessors to Visa and 
Mastercard began to operate national “interchanges” enabling 
cardholders to use their cards outside their bank’s region of operation.102 
The chief function of the interchanges was—and still is—to transfer 
information about a transaction between the cardholder’s issuing bank 
and the merchant’s acquiring bank.103  The brand names of network 
operators like American Express, Discover, Mastercard, Visa, and the 
STAR Network are well-known to consumers, because their logos appear 
on payment cards in consumer pockets, even though the services are 
provided to banks.104 
Payment card networks play two key roles in payment card 
transactions.  Their first role is to facilitate the authorization of a 
payment card transaction.105  When a purchaser uses a payment card to 
pay, the merchant platform initiates payment submission by sending a 
message to the merchant’s bank or a processing service provider, which 
then routes the transaction information to a payment network.106  The 
payment network contacts the consumer’s bank and assists that bank in 
verifying the cardholder’s information, conducting fraud detection 
analyses, and determining whether the cardholder has sufficient funds or 
credit.107  If the transaction is approved, the network sends an approval 
message back to the merchant’s bank or the processing provider, as well 
                                                            
 100.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 79. 
 101.   See LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 31 (1990). 
 102.   See id. 
 103.   See id. 
 104.   See SUSAN HERBST-MURPHY, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OF INTERBANK CARD 
TRANSACTIONS 4 (2013), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/consumer-finance-institute/ 
payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2013/D-2013-October-Clearing-Settlement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P9A2-NQ9W]; First Data Corp., Form 10-K, supra note 44, at 13 (noting that 
Visa, Mastercard, Discover, and the STAR Network compete for debit card network services). 
 105.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 53. 
 106.   See First Data Corp., Form 10-K, supra note 44, at 7–8. 
 107.   See id. 
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as the merchant, through the merchant platform.108 
The second role of the payment card networks is to facilitate the 
clearing and settlement steps of a transaction through a separate series of 
messages.  At the end of each day, a merchant submits a batch of its 
approved authorizations to an account service provider or a processing 
service provider.109  The account provider or processor then routes the 
batch to the payment card network, which sorts the transactions 
attributed to each consumer bank and merchant bank, and provides 
summaries of the net financial positions to each participant.110  The 
network does not itself settle the transaction but submits a fund transfer 
order to a settlement system.111 
Messaging services of the second type, ACH messaging services, 
perform similar functions in a payment transaction, although they batch 
together many transactions, at the end of each day or another set time 
period, for authorization and clearing.112  There are two leading providers 
of ACH messaging services.  The Federal Reserve operates FedACH, 
which began as an extension of the Federal Reserve Banks’ traditional 
clearinghouse function for paper checks,113 a function required by 
statute.114  The Clearing House Payments Company—a private 
consortium of large banks—competes with FedACH to provide ACH 
services through its Electronic Payments Network (“EPN”).115  In recent 
years, the Federal Reserve and EPN have roughly split the ACH market 
in the United States, each with approximately 50% market share.116 
The third type of retail messaging services, retail RTP messaging 
                                                            
 108.   See id. 
 109.   See id. 
 110.   See id. 
 111.   See id.; MANN, supra note 16, at 17, 64. 
 112.   Unlike payment card transactions, which are authorized on an individual basis, an ACH 
operator batches and nets payment messages at the end of a set time period (usually one or two days) 
before routing payment instructions for authorization.  See MANN, supra note 16, at 90–92.  And 
instead of settlement occurring in a separate transaction at the end of each day as in a payment card 
transaction, ACH authorization occurs at the same time that the payment is settled among 
participating banks.  See PAYPAL, supra note 78, at 12, 25. 
 113.   See Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public 
Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1513 (2016). 
 114.   See 12 U.S.C. § 360 (2012) (“Every Federal reserve bank shall receive on deposit at par 
from depository institutions or from Federal reserve banks checks and . . . drafts drawn upon any of 
its depositors . . . .”). 
 115.   GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 8–9, 36.  The 1980 Monetary Control 
Act requires that the Federal Reserve charge fees for its services based on all direct and indirect 
costs actually incurred in providing its services and imputed costs, taking into account costs that 
would have been incurred by a private company.  12 U.S.C. § 248a (2012). 
 116.   GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 47.   
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services, send messages regarding each step of the payment transaction 
so that the transaction is completed in near real-time, without batching or 
netting to reduce transaction volume as in ACH and payment card 
transactions.117  Both The Clearing House RTP system and the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) 
provide retail RTP messaging services.118  Since 2017, The Clearing 
House’s RTP system has supported real-time or near real-time payments 
in amounts up to $25,000.119  The system relies on technology developed 
by Vocalink, a Mastercard subsidiary that also operates RTP services in 
other countries, including the United Kingdom.120  SWIFT is a Belgium-
headquartered cooperative of thousands of banks founded in 1977,121 and 
has until recently focused its U.S. offerings on wholesale payment 
messaging services.122 
2. Wholesale Payment Messages 
Wholesale payment messages are typically sent using one of three 
messaging services.  The Federal Reserve has operated the first service, 
the Fedwire Funds Service, since 1918, to conduct transfers that are 
immediate, final, and irrevocable among U.S. banks that maintain 
accounts at a Federal Reserve Bank.123  The Clearing House, a 
consortium of about 50 of the largest U.S. banks, operates the second 
service, The Clearing House Interbank Payment System (“CHIPS”).124 
                                                            
 117.   See THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS CO. L.L.C., REAL-TIME PAYMENTS OPERATING 
RULES 29–30 (2017) [hereinafter REAL-TIME PAYMENTS OPERATING RULES], 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/real-time-payments/-/media/6de51d5071384153 
9e7b38b91fe262d1.ashx [https://perma.cc/6CJK-D78F]. 
 118.   SWIFT to Facilitate Instant Payments in the U.S., SWIFT (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-to-facilitate-instant-payments-in-the-u_s_ 
[https://perma.cc/5FRQ-D5AQ]. 
 119.   First New Core Payments System in the U.S. in More Than 40 Years Initiates First Live 
Payments, CLEARING HOUSE (Nov. 14, 2017) [hereinafter First New Core Payments System], 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/articles/2017/11/20171114-rtp-first-new-core-
payments-system [https://perma.cc/B3S3-3PM2]; REAL-TIME PAYMENTS OPERATING RULES, supra 
note 117, at 14. 
 120.   See First New Core Payments System, supra note 119. 
 121.   SWIFT History, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us/history [https://perma.cc/A2P3-
TUGF] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).   
 122.   See COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE 
INTERDEPENDENCIES OF PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 25 (2008), https://www.bis.org 
/cpmi/publ/d84.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM7P-MUNT] (describing SWIFT messaging services). 
 123.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 213, 226. 
 124.   THE CLEARING HOUSE, CHIPS PARTICIPANTS (2018) https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-
/media/new/tch/documents/payment-systems/chips_participants_revised_05-29-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J9YN-MGEQ] (listing 45 direct participants as of May 29, 2018); see also MANN, 
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Fedwire and CHIPS provide both messaging and settlement services 
to participants, facilitating the authorization, clearing, and settlement 
steps of a transaction without the need for a separate messaging 
provider.125  The messages contain not only authorization instructions or 
net values for settlement but also the instructions to complete 
settlement.126  Section II.E.2 provides additional detail on Fedwire and 
CHIPS. 
SWIFT also provides wholesale payment messaging services for 
settlement on the CHIPS system and for bilateral settlement on the ledger 
of a correspondent bank at which both the sender and recipient of a 
payment maintain accounts.127  In the United States, SWIFT is primarily 
responsible for sending and receiving information for the U.S. dollar-side 
of cross-border wholesale payments.128  Prospective competition from 
new entrants129 has spurred SWIFT to roll out its own major upgrade 
called Global Payments Innovation, which allows a bank’s corporate 
customers to make cross-border payments in a matter of hours and to 
track the progress of transactions in real-time.130 
F. Settlement Services 
The first five layers in the payment stack do not result in the actual 
discharge of payment obligations, or settlement, between a payment 
sender and recipient.131  That discharge of obligations is generally carried 
out on networks that facilitate settlement on the ledgers and accounts of a 
settlement institution, either a private commercial bank or a Federal 
Reserve Bank.132  Settlement may occur on a gross basis, so that each 
transfer is settled individually, or on a net basis, so that credits and debits 
are periodically offset against each other and the actual volume of 
                                                            
supra note 16, at 213. 
 125.   See FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 88, at 207–208. 
 126.   See id. 
 127.   See id. at 209. 
 128.   See generally SWIFT History, supra note 121. 
 129.   These new entrants include RippleNet.  See Matthew Leising & Edward Robinson, Ripple 
Wants XRP to Be Bitcoin for Banks. If Only the Banks Wanted It, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2018, 4:01 
AM).  Ripple also offers a cross-border payments technology based on DLT, but the adoption rates 
for the DLT offering are even lower than those for RippleNet.  See id. 
 130.   See Major Global Transaction Banks Are Live with SWIFT GPI, SWIFT (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/major-global-transaction-banks-are-live-with-
swift-gpi [https://perma.cc/4KP3-233G]. 
 131.   See MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 773 (2016). 
 132.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 22. 
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transfers is reduced by the offset.133 
1. Retail Payment Settlement 
Two retail payment providers offer both messaging and settlement 
services: FedACH and The Clearing House’s Retail RTP system.  The 
FedACH system provides its own settlement service through accounts at 
Federal Reserve banks.134  The Clearing House’s Retail RTP system 
provides settlement together with other steps of a payment transaction, 
once it has determined that the payment sender has sufficient funds in its 
pre-funded account.135 
Three providers offer retail payment messaging services but not their 
own settlement services: the payment card networks, The Clearing 
House’s ACH offering, and SWIFT’s Retail RTP offering.  Transactions 
that rely on the first two for messaging services are settled on the Federal 
Reserve’s settlement systems.  Payment card transactions are settled 
primarily over Fedwire, with some use of FedACH,136 while payments 
using The Clearing House’s ACH service are settled on the National 
Settlement Service, which the Federal Reserve Banks operate to provide 
Fedwire-like settlement services to messaging service providers.137  
SWIFT facilitates transactions that are settled on The Clearing House’s 
RTP system. 
2. Wholesale Payment Settlement 
Two providers provide wholesale settlement services: Fedwire and 
CHIPS, which together ultimately settle the vast majority of the value of 
U.S. dollar payments in the United States—$1,200 trillion annually.138  
In a Fedwire transaction, the participating institution making the payment 
must either have sufficient funds in its account at the local Federal 
Reserve Bank or permission under Federal Reserve rules to fund a 
transfer that would cause its account balance to go temporarily below 
zero (a circumstance known as a “daylight overdraft”).139  The payments 
are settled on a gross, immediate, and irrevocable basis during the 
                                                            
 133.   See BARR ET AL., supra note 131, at 773. 
 134.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 88. 
 135.   See REAL-TIME PAYMENTS OPERATING RULES, supra note 117, at 29–30. 
 136.   See HERBST-MURPHY, supra note 104, at 12 & n.25 (referring to the use of Fedwire for 
settlement of Mastercard transactions). 
 137.   See FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 14. 
 138.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 52 & 62 n.63. 
 139.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 226–27. 
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systems’ week-day operating hours.140  Fees are charged to both 
participants, primarily based on the volume of transfers and a fixed 
monthly participation fee.141 
CHIPS operates much in the same way as Fedwire, except that it 
requires participants to maintain a pre-funded account at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York;142 settles transactions immediately when 
available balances permit or by the end of the day when the funding 
account has insufficient funds at the time of the transaction;143 and at the 
clearing stage, engages in bilateral and multilateral netting to reduce the 
actual volume of funds transferred and the amount of funds that 
participants need to settle payments.144  Any participant with a net 
negative position at the end of the day must transfer funds through 
Fedwire to its CHIPS account.145 
G. End-to-End Services 
The final category in the payment stack model, situated alongside the 
other six in a parallel track, consists of “end-to-end” providers.  These 
are also known as closed-loop providers because they each provide end-
users with the capability to perform all steps in a payment transaction 
without requiring connections to other payment providers.146  They 
maintain direct relationships—usually in the form of accounts—with 
both the sender and recipient of a payment.147  The settlement process in 
particular is simplified because a single provider can settle payments 
with credits and debits across accounts on its own ledger.148 
End-to-end payment providers have supplied payment services for 
                                                            
 140.   See id. 
 141.   See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., THE FEDWIRE FUNDS SERVICE 10 (2014), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/fedfunds_coreprinciples.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TYW5-T9QW]. 
 142.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 225. 
 143.   See id. at 225–26. 
 144.   THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS CO. L.L.C., CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS 
SYSTEM (“CHIPS”) 32–33 (2016), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/files/payco%2 
0files/standards%20self%20assessment%202016.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/2A87-DD7U]. 
 145.   COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT 
AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 445 (2003), https://www.bis.org 
/cpmi/publ/d53.pdf [https://perma.cc/54RN-WP7F]. 
 146.   See BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 11, at 9. 
 147.   See id. 
 148.   See COMM. ON PAYMENT AND MKT. INFRASTRUCTURE, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
FAST PAYMENTS – ENHANCING THE SPEED AND AVAILABILITY OF RETAIL PAYMENTS 16 (2016) 
[hereinafter BIS/CPMI, FAST PAYMENTS], https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d154.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6QM-PWW3]. 
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many decades.  Western Union, which had consolidated the telegraph 
industry in the United States by the mid-1860s, began to offer end-to-end 
payment services in the 1870s.149  A sender could deposit money with a 
Western Union office in one location, and the telegraph system would 
transmit payment instructions to another Western Union office, where 
the recipient could pick up the money.150  Western Union and its main 
U.S. competitor, MoneyGram, continue to operate significant end-to-end 
operations, especially in the cross-border remittance market.151  The first 
universal payment cards also began as end-to-end services, with a single 
company acting as a trusted intermediary between a consumer and a 
merchant, issuing credit to one and ensuring payment to the other.152  
Over the years other end-to-end payment card operators have appeared, 
but they represent only a small share of the overall payments market.153 
Many nonbank payment companies, including PayPal and Venmo, 
structure their person-to-person payment services as end-to-end services 
that require both the sender and the recipient of a payment to open an 
account in order to send or receive money.154  New end-to-end solutions 
also promise to improve cross-border retail payments, especially person-
to-person payments known as “remittances,” transfers made primarily for 
family, personal, or household purposes.155  This is a market with 
relatively significant frictions, making it highly susceptible to change.  
Cross-border payments take longer to complete than domestic 
                                                            
 149.   See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 202. 
 150.   See id. 
 151.   Zacks Equity Research, MoneyGram, Ant Financial Terminate Merger: What’s Next, 
NASDAQ (January 3, 2018, 9:29 AM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/moneygram-ant-financial-
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 152.   See MANDELL, supra note 101, at xiii, 2–3, 157.   
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retail transactions that do occur are processed by the five largest payment card messaging networks: 
Visa, Mastercard, American Express, China’s UnionPay, and Japan’s JCB.  See id. at 119–20.  But 
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the consumer, may grow substantially as digital trade activity increases.  COMM. ON PAYMENTS & 
MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CROSS-BORDER RETAIL PAYMENTS 1, 3 
(2018) [hereinafter BIS/CPMI, CROSS-BORDER RETAIL PAYMENTS], https://www.bis.org/ 
cpmi/publ/d173.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ23-6QER]. 
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transactions,156 and costs associated with remittances have been 
“notoriously high,” with a global average cost of ten percent in 2008.157  
Those costs have declined more than two percent in less than ten 
years,158 as new entrants and incumbents alike have introduced faster and 
cheaper ways to transfer money overseas,159 without using traditional 
end-to-end remittance providers, such as Western Union,160 or payment 
services that rely on correspondent banks or other cross-border 
connection services.161 
Aside from remittances and other person-to-person payments, 
however, end-to-end payment providers play a relatively small role in the 
payments marketplace, although new entrants have been successful in 
some markets, such as Kenya and India, with relatively little competition 
from incumbent payment providers.162 
III. REGULATION ACROSS THE PAYMENT STACK 
The payment stack model constructed in Part II shows that payment 
services sort into categories according to the function that they serve in 
payment transactions.  This Part describes the regulatory objectives in 
payment services—consumer protection, law enforcement, and financial 
stability—as they map onto each layer of the payment stack.  Figure 2 
provides a summary of that mapping. 
                                                            
 156.   See BIS/CPMI, CROSS-BORDER RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 155, at 1. 
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 160.   See supra Section II.G. 
 161.   See supra Section II.D. 
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Figure 2: Regulation of Payment Stack Layers 
The model shows that regulators have largely taken a functional 
approach to their treatment of these services, so that services within each 
payment stack layer are subject to the same type of regulation.  As 
described in the following sections, the core aspects of payments 
regulation are neutral as to technology and business model.  Consumer 
protection rules—including a risk allocation regime for unauthorized 
transactions and surety bond requirements for money transmitters—
attach to account providers because those providers contract directly with 
consumers and hold funds on their behalf.  Law enforcement rules, 
including customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting 
requirements, attach to account providers as well because those providers 
have primary access to customer information.  And measures supportive 
of financial stability, including the application of enhanced prudential 
standards to systemically important financial market utilities and the 
government operation of infrastructure, enhance certainty in the actual 
transfer of funds among banks. 
The model also shows that what we think of payments regulation is 
today primarily concerned with the activities within only two of the six 
payment stack layers: account and settlement services.  Other payment 
services are generally not subject to payment-specific regulation, with 
some modest exceptions.  This is partly because account and settlement 
services are the ones that may pose payment-specific risks and partly 
because regulators may not need to impose payments-specific regulation 
on activities that are already subject to derivative and background 
banking regulation.  The following sections describe the scope and 
nature of regulation in each payment stack layer. 
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A. Platform Services 
Most providers of consumer platform services—although they 
interact with consumers and allow them to initiate payment 
transactions—do not maintain a contractual relationship with those 
consumers.  They instead supply their services to providers of processing 
and account services in the second and third layers of the payment stack.  
Largely for that reason, no federal law or regulation specifically governs 
consumer platform services.163 
B. Processing Services 
U.S. financial regulators regulate processing services—a field 
dominated by nonbanks—only when they are provided to banks and, 
even then, only maintain a derivative supervisory relationship with 
processing service providers as part of their oversight of those banks.  
When nonbanks enter into contractual arrangements with banks, 
regulators are authorized to supervise the supply of those services to 
banks, primarily for operational and related risks that their operations 
may pose to the financial stability of the banks.164  Regulators continue to 
evaluate risk management primarily through examination of the banks 
themselves,165 which in turn impose private contractual requirements in 
the form of vendor management programs on their nonbank service 
providers.166 
                                                            
 163.   Payment providers, including consumer platforms in the first layer of the payment stack, 
fall outside the reach of federal consumer protection rules, for example, if they: (1) do not hold 
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PROVIDERS 1 (2012) [hereinafter FFIEC, SUPERVISION OF TSPS], https://ithandbook.ffiec. 
gov/media/274876/ffiec_itbooklet_supervisionoftechnologyserviceproviders.pdf [https://perma.cc/8 
FDW-RCHN] (“The Agencies expect financial institutions to have a comprehensive, enterprise risk 
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The Bank Services Company Act, for example, authorizes the three 
federal banking regulators—the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency—to examine and regulate certain payment services provided 
on behalf of or to federally insured banks.167  The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act also authorizes those regulators to take enforcement 
actions against “institution-affiliated parties,” which may include 
nonbank processing providers, that have engaged in knowing or reckless 
conduct that “caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial 
loss to, or a significant adverse effect on, the insured depository 
institution.”168  Analogous state laws authorize state banking regulators 
to supervise nonbank processing providers that contract with state-
licensed banks.169 
The federal banking regulators coordinate their supervision of 
processing service providers through the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (“FFIEC”),170 in consultation with state banking 
regulators.171  Consistent with the role of this layer in the payment 
ecosystem, the examinations focus on identifying and mitigating risks 
associated with a provider’s information technology services.172 
C. Account Services 
The regulatory focus in the account services layer of the payment 
stack is on consumer protection and law enforcement objectives.  Even 
though banks serve as the ultimate custodians of nonbanks’ pooled 
                                                            
[technology service providers (‘TSPs’)].”). 
 167.   See 12 U.S.C. § 1867 (2012); see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGY 26 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684187.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UP7-
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 168.   See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (2012). 
 169.   See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.11 (2018). 
 170.   See FFIEC, SUPERVISION OF TSPS, supra note 166, at 4 (“The Agencies coordinate the 
interagency programs for the supervision of TSPs through the FFIEC.  The programs establish 
responsibilities and requirements for the collaborative efforts of the Agencies to ensure effective 
supervision while making efficient use of examiner resources and reducing burden on the TSPs.”). 
 171.   See FFIEC State Liaison Committee (SLC), FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 
https://www.ffiec.gov/slc.htm [https://perma.cc/V8T2-UZC5] (last modified Sept. 22, 2017, 11:43 
AM). 
 172.   See FFIEC, SUPERVISION OF TSPS, supra note 166, at 1 (“The Agencies conduct IT-related 
examinations of financial institutions and their TSPs based on the guidelines contained in the IT 
Handbook.”).  Although not enforced by regulators, private-system rules such as the NACHA rules 
that govern ACH transactions also impose risk-management controls on financial institutions that 
choose to rely on third-party service providers.  See FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, supra 
note 52, at 52. 
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accounts, the banks and nonbanks in this layer are subject to the same 
general type of consumer protection and law enforcement regulation 
because the nonbanks maintain pooled accounts on behalf of their 
customers. 
1. Consumer Protection 
Account services provided to consumers are subject to consumer 
protection laws and regulations, at both the federal and state level. 
a. Federal Regulation 
The most important federal consumer protection rules are those that 
govern the allocation of losses internal to individual consumer 
transactions and provide incentives to account service providers to 
ensure that they process only transactions that have been authorized by 
their customers.173  These rules allocate nearly all risk of losses due to 
unauthorized transactions to the banks that issue credit cards to 
consumers (under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and Regulation 
Z)174 or to entities that enable payments using funds held in payment 
                                                            
 173.   Federal law and regulation also apply rules governing consumer disclosures and 
statements, the issuance of access devices, methods for resolving errors, and overdrafts to account 
service providers.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (providing disclosure and customer 
consent rules with respect to the sharing of nonpublic personal information about consumers with 
unaffiliated third-parties under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2012) 
(providing consumer disclosure, error resolution, overdraft, and other rules for consumer credit card 
transactions under the Truth in Lending Act); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.1–.61 (2018) (same); 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1693–1693r (2012) (providing consumer disclosure, error resolution, and other rules for consumer 
account transactions under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1005.1–.36 (2018) 
(same).  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows disclosures to nonaffiliated companies, including 
service providers in the other layers of the payment stack in a number of circumstances, including 
arrangements that are disclosed to the consumer.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2), (e).  Federal law and 
regulation also grant credit card users the right to refuse payment to the issuing bank if the goods or 
services are unsatisfactory or not delivered, subject to certain conditions and restrictions.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1666i(a) (unsatisfactory performance); 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a), (b)(3) (non-performance).  
Users of all other digital payment methods are not afforded this “chargeback” right.  See Clayton P. 
Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Uniformity and Diversity in Payment Systems, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
499, 510–11 (2008) (noting that no such rule applies to debit card transactions); James Steven 
Rogers, Unification of Payments Law and the Problem of Insolvency Risk in Payment Systems, 83 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 692 (2008) (same); Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in 
the Information Age, 93 GEO. L.J. 633, 640–46 (2005) (noting that no such rule applies to wire 
transfers and debit card transactions).  The distinction is based on historical concerns that consumers 
making purchases with a credit card may not adequately understand borrowing’s negative 
consequences, although many consumers today use credit cards simply for convenience and pay off 
their balances in full each month.  See Mann, supra note 173, at 651–52, 656.  Reported chargeback 
rates are in any event extremely low, significantly below one percent.  See id. at 661. 
 174.   See 15 U.S.C. § 1643; 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (2018); see also MANN, supra note 16, at 12.  
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“accounts,” including payments using a debit card, prepaid card, ATM, 
an ACH service, or the Retail RTP service (under the Electronic Funds 
Transfer Act (“EFTA”) and Regulation E).175  Private contracts between 
card issuers and other network participants, including merchants, as well 
as state laws, may re-allocate these risks.176 
                                                            
TILA and Regulation Z limit consumer liability for unauthorized transactions (e.g., due to fraud) to 
$50 in point-of-sale transactions where the issuer provides for some method for the cardholder to 
identify as the user of the card (e.g., signature or photograph on the card), impose no liability for 
unauthorized internet transactions and other transactions based solely on card numbers, and require 
credit card issuers to disclose credit terms and conditions to credit card users.  See 12 C.F.R. § 
226.12; Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 76 Fed. Reg. 79,768, 79,957–58 (Dec. 22, 2011) (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).  Under prevailing market norms, however, issuing banks generally waive 
even the $50 of liability that the statute permits in point-of-sale transactions.  See MANN, supra note 
16, at 111.  Although an individual cardholder is not generally liable for losses associated with his 
card, card issuers may have incentives to pass losses onto cardholders as a whole in the form of 
higher interest rates and fees, subject to market forces to compete on price.  See L. Ali Khan, A 
Theoretical Analysis of Payment Systems, 60 S.C. L. REV. 425, 464 (2008).  
 175.   See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r; 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–.20 (2018); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1005.1–.36 
(2018).  EFTA applies only to transfers of funds involving accounts “established primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes.”  15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2).  EFTA and Regulation E do not 
generally apply to wire transfer systems because those systems are not primarily designed to transfer 
funds on behalf of individuals.  See 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(3) (excluding Fedwire and other systems 
“used primarily for transfers between financial institutions or between businesses”).  The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau revised Regulation E in February 2018 (with a proposed effective date 
of April 2019) to apply EFTA to prepaid cards in most instances.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(3) 
(providing that “prepaid cards” generally fall within EFTA protections); Rules Concerning Prepaid 
Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 83 Fed. Reg. 6364, 6420 (Feb. 13, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005, 1026) 
(stating that the term “debit card” generally includes the term “prepaid card” for purposes of EFTA).  
The key distinction between debit card and prepaid card transactions is that a prepaid card allows 
access to a balance previously dedicated to the card without the need for a demand deposit account 
at a financial institution.  See Liran Haim & Ronald Mann, Putting Stored-Value Cards in Their 
Place, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 992 (2014).  This may create an additional risk for the 
consumer in that the issuer of a prepaid card—unlike the issuer of a debit card—need not be a 
depositary institution with federal deposit insurance, and the consumer is exposed to the risk that the 
issuer will become insolvent.  See id. at 1009–10.  Together, EFTA and Regulation E generally limit 
consumer liability for unauthorized transactions to $50 or $500, depending on the circumstances, 
shifting responsibility in most cases to the originating institution, and require institutions holding 
consumer accounts to disclose to consumers the terms and conditions that will govern payments 
made from their accounts.  See 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.4, 205.6–.7.  Consumer liability is technically 
unlimited under EFTA in extreme circumstances, where the account holder does not report the loss 
or theft of an access device such as debit card within 60 days, or within a reasonable time in certain 
extenuating circumstances and the failure to report is a “but for” cause of the account holder’s 
losses.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a).  By their terms, TILA and EFTA also refer to slightly different 
concepts of “unauthorized” use, compare 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o) (defining “unauthorized use” by 
reference to a person without “actual, implied, or apparent authority”), with 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(12) 
(defining “unauthorized electronic fund transfer” by reference to a person without “actual 
authority”), although it is difficult to discern any practical difference, see Gillette & Walt, supra note 
174, at 520 (noting “few reported instances in which consumer liability for third-party use of a credit 
card has rested on the presence of implied or apparent authority and that would likely have been 
decided differently had the debit card standard been applied”). 
 176.   See BARR ET AL., supra note 131, at 765. 
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Although not implicating consumer protection interests, it is useful 
to note that a parallel risk allocation regime exists for transactions 
involving non-consumers.  For those transactions, the risk of loss is 
generally allocated through a combination of the rules of the relevant 
settlement network (if any), Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) as implemented in state law, and private contract.177  The result 
in most cases is that the account providers—and not their customers—
bear the risk of loss.178 
Allocation of liability—away from the consumer and in most cases 
away from other customers—increases confidence and participation in 
                                                            
 177.   See, e.g., Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, The Role of Private Sector Payment Rules 
and a Proposed Approach for Evaluating Future Changes to Payments Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
937, 938–42 (2008).  Fedwire is governed by Regulation J, which largely incorporates the 
requirements of Article 4A of the UCC, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.25–210.32 (2018), and Federal 
Reserve Operating Circular No. 6, see generally FED. RESERVE FIN. SERVS., FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANKS OPERATING CIRCULAR NO. 6 (2017), https://www.frbservices.org/assets/resources/rules-
regulations/operating-circular-6-102917.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX4E-PJMD].  The Federal Reserve’s 
related National Settlement Service is similarly governed by Federal Reserve rules and federal and 
state law.  See generally FED. RESERVE FIN. SERVS., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OPERATING 
CIRCULAR NO. 12 (2016), https://www.frbservices.org/assets/resources/rules-regulations/063016-
operating-circular-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GWT-VSZV].  CHIPS rules apply the law of New 
York, including Article 4A, to CHIPS transactions.  See generally CHIPS RULES, supra note 91.  
Federal Reserve ACH transactions are conducted under rules and guidelines developed by a 
nonprofit banking trade association, NACHA (formerly the National Automated Clearing House 
Association).  See generally NACHA, NACHA OPERATING RULES (2018). 
 178.   For customer-initiated ACH and wire transfers, as between the originator and the 
originator’s bank, Article 4A of the UCC generally places the risk of an unauthorized transaction on 
the originator’s bank unless the bank followed “commercially reasonable” security procedures and 
the information used to access the procedures did not come from a source in the originator’s control.  
See U.C.C. §§ 4A-202, 4A-203 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); see generally MANN, supra note 16, at 258.  
Because EFTA and Regulation E exclude wire transfers, see 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(3), individual 
consumers who initiate wire transfers fall under this UCC rule, while their transfers over the ACH 
system falls under EFTA and Regulation E, see supra note 175 and accompanying text.  Article 4A 
places any risk of settlement failure (due to the failure of a participating institution or the network 
operator to satisfy its obligation) on either the originator’s bank (e.g., where the beneficiary’s bank 
becomes insolvent), see U.C.C. § 4A-402(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2012); see also Rogers, supra note 
173, at 704–05 (describing this “money back guaranty” rule), or the beneficiary’s bank (e.g., where 
the beneficiary’s bank does not wait for settlement to occur before crediting the beneficiary’s 
account with available funds), see U.C.C. § 4A-405 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); see also Francis 
J. Facciolo, Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the Losses, 83 CHI.-KENT. L. 
REV. 605, 614–15 (2008).  For ACH transactions where the purported payee attempts to initiate a 
withdrawal from the non-bank payee’s account (“debit” or “pull” transactions), ACH system rules 
also place the risk of loss on the originating bank, although the contractual arrangement between the 
bank and the originator usually shifts that risk to the originator.  See NACHA, supra note 177, at §§ 
2.2.2.1, 2.2.3.  Article 4A also applies to transactions initiated by the payer’s payment provider, but 
it generally defers with respect to those transactions to network rules that govern the ACH and wire 
transfer systems.  See U.C.C. § 4A-107 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).  Private contracts exclusively govern 
the remainder of fund transfer transactions: wire transfer transactions where the purported payee 
attempts to initiate a withdrawal attempting to debit funds from a non-consumer account.  See Linda 
J. Rusch, Reimagining Payment Systems: Allocation of Risk for Unauthorized Payment Inception, 83 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 561, 589 (2008). 
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the system and creates incentives for account providers to ensure the 
security and accuracy of their systems.179  This maximizes efficient pre-
transaction behavior, especially in the case of highly complex payment 
services with technologically driven features that are exclusively within 
the control of account providers and their vendors.180  Consumers retain 
enough incentives to take steps within their control to avoid unauthorized 
transactions because of the time and potential cost in reversing 
unauthorized charges, doubts that the payment providers will honor their 
obligations, or potentially even ignorance of the consumer protection 
rules.181 
b. State Regulation 
While federal consumer protection rules allocate the risk of loss 
associated with individual transactions, a class of state-level laws seeks 
to protect consumers from entity-level risks associated with certain 
payments services.  The rules seek to ensure that nonbanks providing 
“money transmission” services—generally defined as the receipt and 
transmission to others of customer funds—maintain sufficient liquidity to 
fulfill payment instructions and the ability to honor the withdrawal of 
funds from accounts in a timely manner, through liquidity (and in some 
cases, capital) safeguards.182  Providers in the account services layer of 
the payment stack are subject to these rules because they hold funds in 
                                                            
 179.   See Burge, supra note 113, at 1517, 1539–40.  As with supervision of nonbank processing 
providers, U.S. financial regulators coordinate their supervision and examination of financial 
institutions’ management of risks associated with payments origination, including authentication 
controls, through the FFIEC.  See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN 
INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT 1–6 (2005), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_ 
guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GY3-7ZYH]. 
 180.   See Mann, supra note 173, at 638–39 (arguing that losses are in imposed “almost 
complete[ly]” on payment service providers because of an “implicit premise that losses in 
technology-driven systems are most effectively reduced by technological and system-design 
initiatives that are exclusively within the control of the system operator”); Facciolo, supra note 178, 
at 608 (asserting that such allocation does not apply post-transaction to “unauthorized transactions 
that could be prevented by an account holder’s paying attention to her account and its associated 
statements”).  
 181.   See Mann, supra note 173, at 638.  
 182.   See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS 
ASS’N, THE STATE OF STATE MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 4 
(2016) [hereinafter CSBS & MTRA], https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-
11/State%20of%20State%20MSB%20Regulation%20and%20Supervision%202.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/3WG9-RVNG]; Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for 
Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 535 (2015) 
(“Existing state ‘money transmitter’ and ‘money services businesses’ licensing and prudential 
supervision regimes are focused primarily on safety and soundness.”); BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN 
RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 11, at 36. 
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payment accounts on behalf of consumers.  By contrast, payment 
platforms in the first stack layer are generally not regulated as money 
transmitters even though they assist in transactions that involve the 
transmission of funds to and from those same accounts.  That is because 
platform providers do not have a contractual relationship with 
consumers.  They instead contract with other entities that do have direct 
consumer relationships or with merchants or other non-consumer parties.  
The contractual relationship that a platform maintains could be as the 
agent of a bank,183 the agent of a merchant,184 or the “authorized 
delegate” of a money transmitter.185 
Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have 
licensing regimes for money transmitters,186 so engaging in money 
transmission activities on a nationwide basis requires at least 51 licenses 
no matter where the company is headquartered or otherwise located.187  
The licenses typically require a money transmitter to hold surety bonds 
as a source of funds in the event of institutional distress or 
wrongdoing,188 maintain permissible investments, satisfy minimum net 
worth requirements, and submit periodic reports on transmission volume 
and financial status.189 
                                                            
 183.   See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 2010(d) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 1-109 & 111–157 of 
2018 Reg. Sess.) (excluding from money transmitter regulation any commercial bank or industrial 
bank whose deposits are FDIC-insured, among other firms). 
 184.   See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 2003(b), 2010(l) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 1-109 & 111–
157 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 640(10), 641(1) (Consol., LEXIS through 2018 ch. 
1–205); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.44(8) (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess. & 1st Extra Sess.).  The 
consumer’s payment to the agent is considered final and, if the intermediary is later unable to pay the 
merchant, the contract between the intermediary and the merchant governs the dispute.  California 
also exempts mobile and online payments for goods or services from other requirements under its 
money transmitter rules.  CAL. FIN. CODE § 2103(a)(2)(B) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 1-109 & 
111–157 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (exempting those payments from the requirement to provide a “right to 
refund” statement).   
 185.   See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.44 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess. & 1st Extra 
Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.01–02 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through Legis. passed by 132nd 
Gen. Assemb.); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.2-1900, -1911 (LEXIS through 2018 Spec. Sess. of Gen. 
Assemb.).   
 186.   See PayPal State Licenses, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/licenses 
[https://perma.cc/JB65-DPW9] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (listing the jurisdictions where PayPal is 
licensed as a money transmitter and the acts governing such licensures).  Montana does not require a 
license for money transmitters.  Money Transmitters, MONTANA.GOV, https://banking.mt.gov 
/moneytransmitters [https://perma.cc/T8AV-6GZ5] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (“There is currently no 
legislation from the Montana Division of Banking regulating Money Transmitters.  Money 
Transmitters do not have to be licensed with the Division.”). 
 187.   See, e.g., PAYPAL, supra note 186. 
 188.   See Charles Cooper, Better Tech Allowing State Regulators to Oversee Non-bank Lenders, 
HILL (Mar. 13, 2017, 1:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/323670-better-tech-
allowing-state-regulators-to-oversee-non-bank-lenders [https://perma.cc/K65H-JB7R]. 
 189.   CSBS & MTRA, supra note 182, at 8 (describing common features of state money 
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State money transmitter licensing requirements generally do not 
apply to banks, which are already subject to comprehensive regulation at 
the state and federal levels.190  This exception exists largely because the 
primary objective of banking regulation—to ensure the safety and 
soundness of individual institutions and the financial system as a 
whole—also serves to ensure that banks will have the resources 
necessary to comply with their obligations when providing payment 
services to account holders and other customers.191 
The classic example of a money transmitter is Western Union, which 
in its original form took ownership of customer funds at a physical 
location, deposited them into a bank account, and then waited for the 
recipient to collect the funds at another physical location of Western 
Union or that of an agent.192  Western Union is a licensed money 
transmitter, although many of its services are end-to-end, as discussed 
further in Section III.G, because it conducts its core business of peer-to-
peer transfers without relying on other service providers. 
Most money transmitters today—like PayPal, Venmo, and Square—
of course no longer rely on physical locations but instead require end-
users to open digital accounts, accessible by computer or phone, and to 
receive payments using that account.  After resisting these licensing 
regimes for several years, the first of these new money transmitters, 
PayPal, eventually acknowledged that it fell within this paradigm and 
today holds money transmitter licenses in all states that require them.193 
The state-by-state nature of the money transmitter regime has long 
drawn criticism, spurring efforts in recent years to reduce overlap.  State 
regulators are in the process of standardizing regulatory rules and 
enhancing cooperative supervision of multi-state money transmitters as 
part of a broader commitment to adopt an integrated, fifty-state licensing 
and supervisory system by 2020.194  A sizeable majority of state 
regulators now rely on a uniform “Nationwide Multistate Licensing 
                                                            
transmitter rules). 
 190.   Some states exempt only federally licensed banks, not banks licensed in another state.  
Greg Omer, Fintech: Internet Banking Across State Borders Triggers Compliance Challenges for 
State Banks, THOMPSON COBURN LLP (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/in 
sights/blogs/bank-check/post/2017-01-20/fintech-internet-banking-across-state-borders-triggers-com 
pliance-challenges-for-state-banks [https://perma.cc/EQ83-8A5B]. 
 191.   See MANN, supra note 153, at 735; BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra 
note 11, at 27. 
 192.   See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 202–03. 
 193.   See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 182, at 548. 
 194.   See Vision 2020 for Fintech and Non-Bank Regulation, CSBS (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.csbs.org/vision-2020-fintech-and-non-bank-regulation [https://perma.cc/C2WG-
LAN3]. 
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System” (“NMLS”) to license nonbank money transmitters.195  The 
NMLS seeks to expedite regulatory approvals by automating key 
elements of the approval process and providing common business 
activity definitions in applying regulatory rules.196  The states have also 
established a taskforce through which they coordinate oversight of multi-
state money transmitters.197 
2. Law Enforcement 
Account service providers are also subject to law enforcement 
rules—primarily at the federal level—that are designed to curb money 
laundering, terrorism financing, and other unlawful activities.  Law 
enforcement regulations generally attach to this layer of the payment 
stack because they are designed to apply to companies with primary 
access to information, especially information on end-users, that has “a 
high degree of usefulness” in law enforcement activities.198 
At the core of this regulatory regime is the federal Bank Secrecy Act, 
which requires all “financial institutions,” including banks and state-
licensed nonbank money transmitters, to report cash transactions of 
$10,000 or more, verify the identities of their customers,199 conduct other 
customer due diligence activities depending on a customer’s risk 
rating,200 and file suspicious activity reports whenever they “know[], 
                                                            
 195.   See Cooper, supra note 188. 
 196.   CSBS & MTRA, supra note 182, at 17–19.  
 197.   See id. at 12.  Some state banking regulators are also discussing the possibility of a 
“passporting” regime, which would allow a firm to use regulatory approval from one state as 
permission to operate in another state.  See Bryan A. Schneider, State Regulator to Fintechs: We 
Hear You, AM. BANKER (Mar. 27, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/state-
regulator-to-fintechs-we-hear-you [https://perma.cc/VB2K-X3K4].   
  A recent trend among a small number of states is to attempt an expansion of existing money 
transmitter regulations to cover entities beyond those that send and receive money on behalf of their 
account holders.  These expansions mean that in a limited number of circumstances a company may 
be subject to state money transmitter regulation if it “holds itself out” as a money transmitter, 
advertises or solicits money transmitter services, see, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.302 (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. & 1st called Sess. of 85th Leg.), or has the ability to “instruct” payment, 
see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19-230-010(18) (2017) (defining “money transmission”), irrespective 
of whether it exercises control over consumer funds.  This is generally counter to the historical 
purpose of state money transmitter rules to protect consumer funds while they were in the possession 
of a money transmitter, which “received” and exercised a certain degree of discretionary control 
over those funds.  See Judith E. Rinearson & Jeremy M. McLaughlin, Money Transmitter Licensing, 
Generally, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER GUIDE § 300:210 (2018). 
 198.   See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012). 
 199.   See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5326 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.100 (2017).  
 200.   See FFIEC BSA/AML EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 88, at 56–59. 
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suspect[], or ha[ve] reason to suspect” illegal or terrorist activity.201  U.S. 
banks maintaining correspondent accounts for foreign banks must 
exercise enhanced due diligence when opening and managing those 
accounts202 and are subject to additional financial record-keeping and 
reporting for foreign currency clearing and other transactions.203 
Federal and state laws also require all state-licensed money 
transmitters and other nonbank “money transmitting businesses” that 
accept and transmit funds to comply with state money transmitter 
licensing requirements and to register with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network of the U.S. Treasury Department (“FinCEN”).204  
Money transmitting businesses that fail to register with FinCEN or obtain 
a state license, or knowingly transfer funds received from or in support 
of criminal activity, are subject to criminal penalties under both federal205 
and state law.206  Companies that serve as agents to money services 
businesses, including providers of platform and processing services in 
the first two layers of the payment stack, need not register.207 
D. Connection Services 
The connection services that make up the next layer are not subject 
to regulation designed specifically to address risks arising from their role 
                                                            
 201.   See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2) (2017); see also FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK ET AL., 
INTERAGENCY INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON PROVIDING BANKING SERVICES TO MONEY SERVICES 
BUSINESSES OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2005), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/file 
s/guidance/guidance04262005.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV3E-MC5Q] (“With limited exceptions, 
money services businesses [(now, money transmitting businesses)] are subject to the full range of 
Bank Secrecy Act regulatory controls, including the anti-money laundering program rule, suspicious 
activity and currency transaction reporting rules, and various other identification and recordkeeping 
rules.”). 
 202.   See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(i), (j), (k). 
 203.   See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.630 (2017). 
 204.   The scope of state money transmission licensing regimes is not in all cases coextensive 
with the scope of this federal registration requirement.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a) (2012) (requiring 
any “money transmitting business,” whether or not licensed at the state level, to register with the 
Secretary of the Treasury); id. at § 5330(d) (defining “money transmitting business” as any business 
that provides “money transmitting or remittance services . . . or any other person who engages as a 
business in the transmission of funds” and “money transmitting service” as “accepting currency or 
funds . . . and transmitting the currency or funds”); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(a), (ddd) (2017) (defining 
“accept” and “transmittal”). 
 205.   See 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012); 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012). 
 206.   See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 641, 650 (Consol., LEXIS through 2018 ch. 1–205) 
(providing for misdemeanor and felony penalties for unlicensed money transmission). 
 207.   See 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380(a)(3) (2017); see also Determination of Money Services 
Business Status and Obligations Under the Funds Transfer Recordkeeping Rule, and Request for 
Regulatory Relief, FinCEN Ruling 2009-R004 (Nov. 19, 2009), https://www.fincen.gov/ 
sites/default/files/administrative_ruling/fin-2009-r004.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9X9-QKC7].  
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in the payment stack.  But the overall regulatory regime governing other 
layers of the stack nonetheless assumes that connection service providers 
will provide their services and that they are composed of a particular 
class of firms—banks.208 
Banks are subject to regulatory requirements that are markedly 
different from those applicable to nonbank financial service providers.  
Banking regulation imposes capital requirements and other prudential 
requirements on banks that have no close analog in the nonbank world.209  
In exchange, banks serve as the exclusive providers of certain financial 
services (such as deposit-taking and commercial lending funded from 
that deposit-taking) and receive exclusive access to messaging and 
settlement services.210  This exclusivity allows them to act as gatekeepers 
with respect to all other market participants, advantaging banks in the 
provision of services that require seamless connections to those systems 
and increasing incentives for nonbanks to partner with banks rather than 
challenge them directly in the provision of those services. 
E. Messaging Services 
For the most part, U.S. financial regulators do not directly regulate 
messaging service providers, whose operations are governed primarily 
by contracts among network participants.211  The one regulatory regime 
that applies directly to the messaging networks themselves is a relatively 
narrow set of law enforcement rules.212  Payment card networks must 
establish anti-money laundering compliance programs for the selection 
and approval of participating banks,213 to prevent those participants from 
using the network to facilitate money laundering or the financing of 
terrorist activities.214  These requirements are in turn hardwired into 
network operators’ own rules governing network participation.215 
                                                            
 208.   See supra Section II.D. 
 209.   See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 50–51, 55 
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F. Settlement Services 
The orderly settlement of payments, especially wholesale payments 
given their high value, is essential to achieving one payment-related 
regulatory objective—financial stability.216  Because settlement may give 
rise to financial, operational, and other risks to the participants and the 
settlement system operator, U.S. regulators operate their own settlement 
systems and subject private operators of systemically important 
settlement systems to regulation designed to achieve financial stability 
objectives.217 
The operators of the two wholesale payment settlement services in 
the United States, Fedwire and CHIPS, have taken steps to mitigate these 
risks.218  For one, there are no credit exposures within CHIPS, either to 
the system or its participants, because CHIPS has no obligation to settle 
queued payments, the system provides no credit to participants, and 
participants do not extend credit to one another over the system.219 
Liquidity risks to CHIPS participants remain, however, because 
payment messages in the queue are not guaranteed to settle, and 
participants may not receive expected payments.220  If a participant does 
not meet its final, end-of-day funding requirements, CHIPS will net and 
process as many outstanding transactions as possible and then delete any 
unfunded transactions from the system.221  Participants expecting to 
receive those deleted payments must arrange to receive any necessary 
liquidity outside of CHIPS.222  Liquidity risk is at its highest when 
participants have a final, end-of-day expected position that depends on 
other participants meeting their end-of-day funding requirements.223  The 
                                                            
content/dam/mccom/global/documents/mastercard-rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/94US-WTYA].  
 216.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 22; FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 
1, at 47. 
 217.   The Federal Reserve’s Key Policies for the Provision of Financial Services, 
FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pfs_frpaysys.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G9PL-7695] (last updated Nov. 20, 2008) (“The Congress, responding in part to 
the breakdown of the check-collection system in the early 1900s, made the Federal Reserve an active 
participant in the payments system when it established the Federal Reserve in 1913.  At that time the 
Congress envisioned that the Federal Reserve would play a dual role as an operator and a regulator 
of the payments system.”). 
 218.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 274–75.  The same is true of settlement that takes place on 
the accounts of a single correspondent bank, which occurs only once the recipient bank has satisfied 
itself that the originating bank is able to fund the transfer.  See id. 
 219.   See FSOC Ann. Rep., supra note 89, at 146–47. 
 220.   See id. 
 221.   See id. 
 222.   See id. 
 223.   See id. 
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failure of one institution to meet its funding requirements or a disruption 
in the system could lead to liquidity problems spreading among 
participants and their customers.224 
CHIPS attempts to mitigate liquidity risk to participants through 
bilateral and multilateral netting arrangements for payments that are 
processed in batches, so that an individual institution’s credits and debits 
are offset against one another before CHIPS processes payment 
batches.225  This reduces liquidity risk by reducing the amount of funds 
needed to settle payments.226  There has been only one instance where a 
participant failed to meet its final funding requirement, resulting in a 
failure to settle $7.3 billion in payments.227 
By contrast, Fedwire guarantees the settlement of payments made on 
its system, including in some circumstances where a bank has exceeded 
its daily pre-funded balance (a “daylight overdraft”), and it settles each 
transaction on a real-time basis, rather than waiting to batch and net 
certain payments together.228  This provides substantial commercial 
benefits to Fedwire participants, especially those engaged in large 
commercial transactions, because the receipt of funds is irrevocable and 
verifiable in near real-time.229 
Fedwire mitigates the resulting credit and liquidity risk through 
system rules and regulation or by bearing the risk itself.  The Federal 
Reserve establishes daylight overdraft limits specific to each bank and 
charges a substantial fee to cover them, for example.230  Even so, the 
Federal Reserve Banks that provide this intraday credit are exposed to 
the risk that an institution will become insolvent during the course of 
day, up to the institution’s permitted daylight overdraft amount.231  
Fedwire operations are thus premised on the public sector’s provision of 
credit, converting the liquidity risk otherwise borne by participating 
institutions into credit risk borne by the Reserve Banks.232 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”) must designate as a systemically important “financial market 
                                                            
 224.   See id. at 151. 
 225.   See THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS CO. L.L.C., supra note 144, at 32–33. 
 226.   See id. 
 227.   See FSOC Ann. Rep., supra note 89, at 148. 
 228.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 274–75. 
 229.   See id. at 229–30. 
 230.   See id. at 227. 
 231.   See id. at 229; BARR ET AL., supra note 131, at 776. 
 232.   See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 141, at 15; see also BARR ET AL., supra note 131, at 
776. 
2018 MODELING PAYMENTS REGULATION  125 
utility” (“FMU”) any entity engaged in payment, clearing, or settlement 
activity if the Council determines that the failure of or disruption to the 
functioning of the entity could create, or increase, the risk of significant 
liquidity or credit problems spreading among financial institutions or 
markets, thereby threatening the stability of the U.S. financial system.233  
FSOC has designated only one payment service provider, The Clearing 
House, as a systemically important FMU, because it operates CHIPS.234 
This designation means that The Clearing House is subject to 
heightened prudential and supervisory provisions intended to promote 
robust risk management and safety and soundness under the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Regulation HH,235 which is based on international risk-
management standards for payment services.236  Regulation HH 
prescribes standards relating to governance, risk management, and credit 
risk, including rules requiring The Clearing House to establish a plan for 
recovery and orderly wind down and to meet minimum capital and 
liquidity requirements.237 
Other settlement systems, due to their smaller size or design choices, 
do not pose the same type or degree of risk.  Although ACH services 
process large sums, multilateral netting and batching at the end of the 
each day before settlement  has largely eliminated credit and liquidity 
risk.238  Messaging networks that process payment card transactions, for 
their part, also engage in multilateral netting, further reducing volumes 
that are already too small to contribute materially to financial risks 
                                                            
 233.   See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5461–72 (2012). 
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 235.   See 12 C.F.R. § 234.1–.6 (2018); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5461 (2012) (authorizing the 
Federal Reserve to provide enhanced supervision over financial market utilities). 
 236.   See generally COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS. & THE TECH. COMM. OF THE 
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MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf [https://perma.cc 
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ensure a recovery or orderly wind down of critical operations.  See generally Policy on Payment 
System Risk, 79 Fed. Reg. at 2850. 
 238.   See Mann, supra note 19, at 966–67.  
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associated with settlement systems.239  The Clearing House’s Retail RTP 
system does not generally engage in multilateral netting and batching but 
currently operates at much lower volumes than the other retail services. 
G. End-to-End Services 
End-to-end payment providers are generally subject to the 
cumulative range of regulations that apply to the providers of individual 
services within the payment stack.  The primary exception as a practical 
matter is in the area of remittances.  Because this is a market dominated 
by end-to-end providers, regulation that applies specifically to 
remittances in practice applies predominantly to those providers.240  The 
CFPB issued regulations in 2013 that seek to enhance transparency and 
accountability of remittance transactions involving U.S. consumers, 
while also establishing default execution rules for remittance market 
participants.241  The rules apply to any supplier that conducts remittance 
transfers for U.S. persons, whether or not the consumers hold an account 
with the supplier.242 
This Part has described the scope and nature of regulation governing 
the services that make up the payment stack model.  The next Part 
examines a range of potential consequences of financial change on the 
structure and content of the payment stack model and sets out regulatory 
strategies for addressing those potential effects. 
IV. STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
FINANCIAL CHANGE ON THE PAYMENT STACK 
The model presented in this Article is useful in visualizing two basic 
concepts: one, that despite the vast array of payment services and 
providers, both old and new, they sort into a relatively small number of 
interconnected categories; and two, that despite the smattering of 
seemingly disparate U.S. payments regulations and regulators, payment 
services within each category are generally subject to the same types of 
rules and standards. 
                                                            
 239.   The current volume of retail payments transacted over the payment card messaging 
networks is an order of magnitude or two smaller than the overall volume of wholesale payments.  
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 240.   See 12 C.F.R. § 1005.30–.36 (2018). 
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Payments is not a static ecosystem, however, and the payment stack 
remains subject to market forces, with a wide range of possible 
outcomes.  Markets could fragment and become more decentralized or 
they could become more concentrated.243  New entrants could become 
viable competitors or find themselves swallowed up by incumbents 
before they become threats.244  Incumbents that have cultivated consumer 
trust and brand recognition for decades will at the same time continue to 
rely on their considerable resources to invest in their own technologies, 
lower prices as necessary to maintain market share, and acquire their 
competitors before they present existential challenges.245 
No matter the outcome of these market forces, a chief lesson from 
the payment stack model is that the answer to technology or business-
model trends is not to engage in a wholesale revision of payments 
regulation.  Instead, the technology-neutral and activity-based nature of 
payments regulation means that the framework is likely capable of 
adapting to new challenges, even in times of immense change, and that 
regulators have the opportunity to follow a more nuanced and tailored 
approach.246 
That is not to say that payments regulation should remain static.  
Financial change is also an opportunity to evaluate areas where new 
entrants and services underscore existing shortcomings and to examine 
areas where clarification, substantive revisions, or new approaches would 
better serve their objectives.247  And even with a largely technology-
neutral and activity-based regulatory regime, financial change may 
require new regulatory approaches.  In some cases, it might cause aspects 
of regulation to become obsolete, as technology alters the relative 
importance of various risks, as is possibly the case with the increasingly 
critical importance of operational risks.  In other situations, regulators 
may be able to affirmatively seek to foster innovation while monitoring 
financial change that poses relatively low risk. 
Change in technology or business model might also provide new, 
pro-regulatory opportunities.248  It may allow regulators to improve their 
                                                            
 243.   See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 10–11, 21. 
 244.   See id. at 10–11. 
 245.   See Rysman & Schuh, supra note 5, at 43. 
 246.   See supra Part III. 
 247.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 39 (“The Faster Payments Task 
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regulatory and supervisory methods, particularly in information 
collection and analysis.  Or it may present regulators with the 
opportunity to assist in advancing market-based solutions that benefit 
regulators, service providers, and customers.  The following analyzes 
each of these potential strategies in turn. 
A. Expressly Apply Existing Regulation to Financial Change 
Because payments regulation is largely technology-neutral and 
activity-based, regulators have been able to adapt to many changes 
through application of existing regulations.  Examples include 
circumstances where regulators have determined that making payment 
services faster—and cheaper—is not expected to heighten or introduce 
new risks249 or that the risks associated with payment services do not 
materially vary depending on whether the transactions are recorded on a 
distributed ledger.250  Enhancing legal certainty through explicit 
application of existing regulation can, where appropriate, promote 
customer welfare, reduce compliance costs, and mitigate operational 
risks.251 
The widespread application of existing state money transmitter and 
federal anti-money laundering regulation to virtual currency services in 
the third layer of the payment stack is instructive.  Nearly all state and 
federal regulators have determined that virtual currency wallet and other 
payment account providers relying on distributed ledger technology 
(“DLT”) pose the same types of financial risks as traditional account 
service providers because they are responsible for holding value on 
behalf of their customers.252  The role of these account providers in DLT 
transactions has allowed regulators to apply existing money transmission 
regulations in the account services layer of the payment stack.253 
Application of existing payments regulation is generally feasible in 
                                                            
 249.   See BIS/CPMI, FAST PAYMENTS, supra note 148, at 1. 
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these circumstances because current DLT use cases require account 
providers to serve as gatekeepers to enter or exit the DLT system.  Even 
an open and permissionless DLT network requires trusted intermediaries 
to interface with the broader economy, to “cash into” the system to fund 
virtual currency transactions with an initial infusion of fiat currency, and 
to “cash out” of the system to pay for goods, services, and investments in 
fiat money.254  These gatekeepers will continue to serve these critical 
functions as long as DLT services continue to operate alongside, rather 
than in lieu of payments in U.S. dollars.255  End-users may in any event 
continue to choose to store their private and public keys required to 
access and send tokenized money with a wallet or other account 
provider.256 
The state-level approach to virtual currencies has not been entirely 
uniform, but the clear trend is to treat payment services that use virtual 
currency no differently than payment services transmitting legal tender.  
Most states that have considered the issue of virtual currency businesses 
have issued guidance that interprets existing money transmitter rules as 
encompassing virtual currency activities257 or modified their laws or 
regulations to make clear that existing money transmitter regulations 
apply to virtual currency businesses.258  Nearly all states have issued 
licenses under existing money transmitter rules to companies that rely at 
least in part on virtual currencies.259 
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New York is in the small minority of states that have taken different 
approaches.  It has created a specialized money transmitter license for 
services that rely on virtual currency, presumably because of heightened 
consumer protection concerns,260 but the regime is widely regarded as a 
failure, with few companies receiving or even seeking a license.261  The 
“BitLicense” borrows heavily from the state’s existing money transmitter 
licensing regime, while imposing some obligations that do not apply to 
other money transmitters and that, in some cases, are duplicative of 
federal consumer protection and anti-money laundering rules.262  These 
include minimum capital requirements that go beyond the surety bond 
requirements applicable under the state’s general money transmission 
rules.263 
Federal regulators have also generally applied existing anti-money 
laundering regulations to virtual currency service providers.  FinCEN has 
made clear that it intends to regulate virtual currency activities in a 
manner equivalent to similar activities conducted using U.S. dollars and 
other fiat currencies, noting that the definition of “money transmitter” in 
the statute does not differentiate between legal tender and virtual 
currencies that are convertible into legal tender.264  This appears to be 
based in large part on a judgment that “virtual currency is not different 
from other financial products and services” because any payment system 
can be “exploited for money laundering.”265 
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Unlike entity-level consumer safeguards at the state level or law 
enforcement rules at the federal level, allocation of risk under federal 
consumer protection rules may prove more difficult to apply coherently 
in some cases.  The premise of federal consumer protection rules—
particularly rules governing allocation of risk—is that payment account 
providers have control over authorization of a payment transaction, 
which confirms whether the appropriate end-user authorized the 
transaction.  These rules may make less sense in circumstances—as in 
“open, permissionless” DLT systems—in which unidentified entities 
have at least partial control over authorization of a payment transaction. 
U.S. regulators have not yet responded in full to these potential 
issues.266  In its recent update to consumer protections regulations under 
EFTA and Regulation E, for example, the CFPB expressly declined to 
consider the application of those risk-allocation rules to virtual 
currency.267  Although payment providers are able to efficiently allocate 
risk among themselves through private contracts, regulators have not 
answered whether consumers should, as a matter of law, benefit from the 
same risk-shifting mechanisms available to them when using non-DLT 
account services.268 
B.  Correct Existing Asymmetries in Treatment of Technologies and 
Business Models 
Although expressly applying existing payments regulation to 
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financial change will work in many circumstances, regulators should be 
cautious in applying off-the-shelf any payments regulation that is not 
neutral with respect to technology and business model.  In those cases, 
financial change may underscore the need—and provide the impetus—for 
regulatory improvements.  Financial change in this way presents an 
opportunity to examine old rules and standards with the benefit of a fresh 
perspective.  The opportunity is especially relevant to the details of 
money transmitter rules in certain states that continue to reflect historical 
concerns associated with older business models and technologies, 
creating unnecessary heterogeneity among state-level approaches.269 
As described above in Section III.C.1, state regulators originally 
designed money transmitter rules to ensure that entities that intermediate 
funds on behalf of consumers—those that held consumer accounts or 
exchanged currency, for example—would not become insolvent and 
leave their customers without the ability to reclaim their money.  But in 
some states these rules appear to rigidly tie those objectives to fixed 
capital requirements or bonding requirements that do not reflect the 
actual risk posed by a participant’s size or volume of business in the 
state.270 
Some state rules also reflect the business methods and technology of 
the past, which required consumers to initiate money transmissions in-
person, at a Western Union office, for example.  Many state statutes 
assume that payment account service providers in the third layer of the 
payment stack continue to follow this model, by calculating surety bond 
and minimum net worth rules, for example, based on the number of 
physical locations in the state.271  A very limited set of state regulations 
also place similarly anachronistic restrictions on consumer platforms in 
the first payment stack layer that contract with money transmitters, 
requiring some platforms to maintain a physical location in the state.272 
 
                                                            
 269.   See Benjamin Lo, Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on 
Payments Innovation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 111, 117–20 (2016). 
 270.   See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 6107 (Westlaw through May 2, 2018) 
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 271.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1205.01 (Westlaw through 1st Spec. & 2d Reg. Sess. 
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 272.   See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN CODE § 208-690-035(4) (LEXIS through July 5, 2018). 
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C  Prepare for Potential Regulatory Obsolescence from “Payment Stack 
Collapse” 
Although most analyses have concluded that financial change in 
payments (or in other financial services, for that matter) does not yet 
pose compelling financial stability risks,273 the payment stack model can 
also usefully illustrate the possible future effects of financial change that 
would make existing regulation obsolete.  Obsolescence might lead to a 
number of negative consequences, including affording commercial 
advantages to less regulated entities, encouraging strategic law avoidance 
or influencing other marketplace behaviors,274 and encouraging firms to 
price risk according to inconsistent  risk management approaches.275 
The following sets out two possible trends in financial change that 
may make existing payments regulation obsolete in certain key respects: 
(1) the possible emergence of DLT as an underlying technology for 
payment services and (2) the continued rise of nonbanks.  Both trends 
could collapse distinctions among layers in the payment stack model and 
create conditions that enable less regulated or unidentifiable entities to 
dominate the provision of services in those layers, leading to possible 
regulatory escape and diminished regulatory efficacy. 
1. DLT-induced Payment Stack Collapse 
The emergence of DLT as an underlying technology for payment 
services could lead to at least two types of payment stack collapse.  The 
first type would result in DLT collapsing distinctions among the 
connection, messaging, and settlement layers.  The second type would 
collapse distinctions among those layers as well as the account service 
layer.  Figure 3 illustrates both types of DLT-induced payment stack 
collapse. 
Like physical cash or the historical use of bearer bonds, DLT relies 
on a tokenized form of money, meaning that users exchange digital 
representations or “tokens” of money directly without the need for a 
contemporaneous clearing or settlement process that confirms that the 
                                                            
 273.   See DONG HE ET AL., supra note 157, at 32 (noting that “no contagion to the wider 
financial system has thus far been observed” due to disruptions in digital money systems); 
BIS/CPMI, FAST PAYMENTS, supra note 148, at 69 (“Most central banks judge that the influence of 
this type of [fast payment] system on monetary policy and financial stability is limited for the time 
being.”). 
 274.   See Tim Wu, Commentary, Strategic Law Avoidance Using the Internet: A Short History, 
S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT, Mar. 2017, at 7, 8. 
 275.   See BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 11, at 2. 
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originator has sufficient funds or credit.276  An institution that issues a 
DLT token to an end-user deducts the token’s value as denominated in 
U.S. dollars or another currency from the end-user’s account at the time 
of issuance, and the end-user is then free to exchange the instrument to a 
third-party recipient.277 
From that point on, the fate of the token is no longer the 
responsibility of the account service provider, and there is no need to 
check with the account provider to ensure that an account holder was the 
one that initiated the payment.  In a DLT transaction, an end-user 
initiates the payment with its private key, which is cryptographically 
combined with the user’s public key and information about the payment 
such as the amount and the public key of the recipient.278  The end-user’s 
private key operates as a token because the only question to be answered 
in transaction processing is whether the token is valid, not whether the 
holder of the token is authorized to spend it.279  There is no need for 
separate account, connection, messaging, and settlement services because 
the use of tokens eliminates the need to debit the sender’s account and 
credit the recipient’s account. 
 
                                                            
 276.   See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGIES (FINTECH) 51, (Feb. 2017) [hereinafter IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT], 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6KQ-TA5G].  
Introduced in 2009 as the technology underlying the virtual currency bitcoin, DLT involves a ledger, 
or database, that is distributed over an at least partially decentralized network of computers that 
enables network participants to share and retain records.  See Matthew Swinehart & Merritt Baer, 
Those Things You’ve Heard About Bitcoin: Distinguishing Between Signal and Noise, 16 GEO. J. 
INT’L AFF. 144, 146–47 (2015).   
 277.   See MANN, supra note 16, at 9 (describing the issuance and exchange of tokens generally). 
 278.   Swinehart & Baer, supra note 276, at 151–52. 
 279.   See id.  
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Figure 3:  Partial Payment Stack Collapse Due to Nonubiquitous (left) 
and Ubiquitous (right) Use of Open, Permissionless DLT 
a. Open, Permissionless DLT 
First-generation DLT regimes such as bitcoin are “open” and 
“permissionless,” meaning that they are accessible by any interested 
participant,280 each of which enjoys equal access to the network.281  
Participants may come and go without approval by other participants or a 
central authority.  If open and permissionless DLT regimes become 
ubiquitous, and there is no need for a user to rely on non-DLT payment 
services, account providers would become unnecessary and regulators 
would have no entity to regulate.  As shown on the left-hand side of 
Figure 3, ubiquitous use of DLT payment services could lead to “full” 
payment stack collapse in the sense that the payment services largely fall 
outside the existing regulatory perimeter that relies primarily on account 
providers and settlement systems. 
But this “ubiquitous” use scenario would require a degree of virtual 
currency adoption that appears unlikely based on current evidence.  
Many first-generation virtual currencies have been the victims of their 
own success in attracting the public’s attention.  The volatility and 
speculative nature of trading in many virtual currencies, for example, has 
                                                            
 280.   See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 41; IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT, 
supra note 276, at 48, 59. 
 281.   See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 182, at 497–98. 
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made them almost worthless as a payment method.282  That volatility—
and the speculation that drives it—complicates the pricing of goods and 
services and overloads the system, as those wanting to use virtual 
currency to make a payment must compete with those wanting to trade it 
as an asset.283  Given these realities, it is no surprise that the volume and 
value of virtual currency transactions remain a tiny fraction of digital 
payments284 and that virtual currencies are widely viewed, not as 
payment methods, but as (rather speculative) investment assets.285 
And yet a more limited form of payment stack collapse is already the 
reality with first-generation DLT, as shown in Figure 3.  In this “non-
ubiquitous” use scenario, account providers such as Coinbase that 
maintain end-user private keys in a virtual currency wallet, remain 
identifiable and within the regulatory perimeter because users must cash 
in and cash out of the DLT system.  Banks are no longer needed to 
provide connection services, however, while the type of financial 
stability regulation that now attaches at the settlement layer is no longer 
necessary because no settlement occurs in a tokenized transaction. 
b. Closed, Permissioned DLT 
The second-generation DLT regimes that may have the most durable 
promise, including companies like Ripple, are different in many respects 
from a regulatory perspective.  These regimes are “closed” and 
“permissioned,” meaning that the network’s nodes are granted access 
only after meeting certain criteria.286  This design allows a central 
authority or existing nodes in a DLT network to grant varying degrees of 
permission to new participants in terms of access information on the 
                                                            
 282.   See Matt O’Brien, Bitcoin Is Teaching Libertarians Everything They Don’t Know About 
Economics, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018) (“Bitcoin changes prices too quickly to be a currency and 
processes transactions too slowly to be a payments system.”); Olga Kharif, You’d Be Crazy to 
Actually Spend Bitcoin, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2018, 12:00 PM CST), https://www.bloomberg.com 
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 283.   See Kharif, supra note 282. 
 284.   See DONG HE ET AL., supra note 157, at 31. 
 285.   See Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at Cryptocurrency, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-are-looking-at-
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with Currency Startup Ripple, WALL ST. J.  (Jan. 11, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/moneygram-signs-deal-to-work-with-currency-startup-ripple-1515679285 (noting that only 
one institution “has signed up to specifically use [Ripple’s virtual currency] for settling cross-border 
trades”). 
 286.   See Mills et al., supra note 9, at 31. 
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ledger and ability to participate in the consensus mechanism used to 
validate transactions.287  Unlike open and permissionless DLT networks, 
the entities responsible for account services in a second-generation DLT 
regime remain identifiable and within the existing regulatory perimeter.  
These regimes are thus unlikely to cause regulatory escape associated 
with payment stack collapse. 
Closed and permissioned DLT regimes are already in limited use in 
the cross-border wholesale payments market.  Incumbent methods of 
cross-border wholesale payments require a number of intermediaries, 
each of which adds to the cost of making a payment,288 and may take up 
to five days, even for the most common currency pairings.289  New 
entrants such as Ripple and Kalypton,290 as well as a partnership between 
incumbent Visa and startup Chain, Inc.,291 promise faster and cheaper 
cross-border wholesale payments using DLT services.292 
2. Nonbank-induced Payment Stack Collapse 
A second form of payment stack collapse could occur as nonbanks 
become ubiquitous suppliers of services and supplant banks from the 
payments market.  Because of the historically bank-centric nature of 
payment services and regulation, displacement of banks could lead to 
regulatory escape and reduced effectiveness of the existing payment 
regulatory framework. 
The rise of nonbanks in financial services is a trend that is much 
broader than the payments market.  Online and mobile banking has 
undercut the traditional advantages of physical distribution that banks 
and their physical retail branches (and later their network of ATMs) once 
enjoyed.293  Consumers today are more open to relationships with 
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 288.   See id., at 18. 
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nontraditional companies that provide personalized and streamlined 
platform and account services.294  And nonbank companies have 
introduced cheaper, more efficient, and more secure processing services, 
greatly expanding their market share with reliance on improved and 
expanded data sources, cloud computing and mobile internet 
functionality, and data analytics, including artificial intelligence and 
search engine services.295  Banks increasingly face the choice of 
competing or partnering with less regulated technology companies, while 
attempting to maintain their core value proposition.296 
When it comes to payment services in particular, nonbanks already 
have a substantial presence.  Significant portions of payments and other 
financial data is now stored and processed using the cloud computing 
services of large technology companies, including Amazon, Google, and 
Microsoft.297  Other technology companies, including Alibaba, Apple, 
and Facebook have entered the payments market in recent years.298  And 
much of modern payments technology, including artificial intelligence 
and other advanced fraud detection services, depend on access to 
nonbank services.299 
The resulting increase in competition from these changes in 
technology and business models has already placed downward pressure 
on prices.300  Other effects are possible in the future, although there is not 
yet any evidence of regulatory-significant effects in today’s market.  
Nonbank competition may eventually transform payment services from 
relatively lucrative activities in their own right to loss-leaders for other 
financial services, or cause payment providers to seek new ways of 
monetizing relationships with payments customers.301  Increased 
competition may mean that banks lose significant revenue from payment 
services and an anchoring or entry point to other bank services,302 and in 
response choose to take on more risk, potentially without proper 
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pricing.303  If nonbanks became dominant in the provision of account 
services to consumers, for example, there is a possibility that banks 
would also have reduced access to stable and secure funding from 
deposits.304  This could lead to reliance on riskier deposits or wholesale 
funding, leading to a deterioration in key regulatory metrics such as the 
net stable funding ratio.305 
The competitive effects associated with nonbank dominance in the 
supply of payments services could in turn produce two basic scenarios of 
payment stack collapse.  The first would involve significant displacement 
of banks from the platform, processing, and account layers of the 
payment stack, as shown on the left-hand side of Figure 4.  This could 
give rise to questions about the efficacy of the existing regime, 
particularly with respect to the derivative regulation of nonbank 
processing services.  This scenario is already a reality in some other 
markets, including China, where technology firms Alibaba and Tencent 
now control 97% of the payments markets.306 
The second payment stack collapse scenario would involve 
displacement of banks further down in the payment stack, including in 
the connection services layer, as shown on the right-hand side of Figure 
4.  This would raise more complex questions about the degree to which 
the background banking regulation applicable to connection services 
supports financial stability and other regulatory objectives specifically 
associated with payment services. 
But the second scenario would require significant market changes to 
occur and regulators to grant nonbanks access to the messaging and 
settlement networks, which are currently available only to banks, 
reducing or eliminating demand for connection services.  As discussed 
earlier, the bank-centric nature of existing payment services is a function 
of both the relationships that banks maintain with commercial and 
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investment banking clients, which account for most of the payments 
volume (through wholesale regimes), and regulation and system rules 
that limit participation in messaging and settlement networks. 
 
Figure 4:  Partial Payment Stack Collapse Due to Dominant Supply by 
Nonbanks of Services in the Top Three Layers (left) and Top 
Four Layers (right) 
Under either scenario, if nonbanks continue to increase their share of 
the payments market, regulators could face at least two key challenges 
related to the bank-centric nature of existing payments regulation.  The 
first is related to operational risk and the current model of derivative 
regulation of nonbanks that provide services to banks outlined in Section 
III.B.  The second possible challenge is related to the background 
banking regulation that applies to payment services, especially through 
the connection services layer. 
The rise of nonbanks in the top three layers of the payment stack—
platform, processing, and account services—has already resulted in a 
movement of significant amounts of information technology systems into 
the hands of nonbanks.  The critical question with respect to nonbank 
participation in these layers is whether derivative regulation of these 
nonbank suppliers of processing and other services is appropriate if 
banks are no longer the primary architects and operators of their own 
processing and other information technology operations. 
All payment services—no matter the technology or business plan—
involve operational risks, including risks associated with errors or delays 
in processing, system outages, insufficient capacity, fraud, data loss and 
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leakage, and other cyber and physical security risks.307  New entrants and 
incumbents alike have recently faced high-profile cyberattacks and other 
operational issues.308 
Nonbank specialization in the top three layers of the payment stack 
represents a potential opportunity as well as a potential challenge.  On 
one hand, it has the potential to reduce operational risks.309  
Technological changes, such as dynamic tokenization now available in 
mobile payments, for example, might enhance the security of payments 
by eliminating the need to transfer payment card details for in-person 
payments.310  On the other hand, new vulnerabilities may not become 
apparent until a technological change is deployed in the marketplace at 
scale.311  And specialization may also transfer certain risks from highly 
regulated banks to relatively unregulated providers,312 or lead, with 
unpredictable consequences, to a newly fractured market composed of 
numerous banks and nonbanks in competition with one another.313 
The rise of nonbanks could also mean that the background banking 
regulation that applies to payment services, including through the 
connection services layer of the payment stack, becomes less effective in 
mitigating both operational and financial risks associated with payment 
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services.  To the extent that that the dependence of nonbanks on the 
connection services of banks decreases in the future (because, for 
example, they no longer need banks to access messaging and settlement 
services), the degree to which background banking regulation applies to 
payment services will also decrease. 
But it is difficult to assess with any precision whether and to what 
extent the non-application of background banking regulation to payment 
services would raise substantive concerns.  What we do know is that 
banking regulation is primarily intended to address risks that arise from 
activities other than bank-provided payment services.314  It is true of 
course that regulators have an interest in ensuring that payment services 
are not risk vectors to other parts of the financial system and real 
economy, as outlined in Section II.B.  But we have no sense today—with 
a payments market that is still very much bank-centric—whether banking 
regulation as such is required to address these concerns. 
Take, for example, bank capital requirements.  They are designed to 
address financial risks associated with fractional banking but they also 
provide the ancillary benefit of ensuring that funds held in payment 
accounts are secure and that payments are funded and made on time.  
Regulators have not had to consider what measure of capital, if any, 
would be appropriate in a payments market reliant primarily or entirely 
on nonbanks, which are not leveraged in the same manner as banks. 
In broad contours, the basic alternative to the current derivative and 
background regulatory frameworks is to apply regulation more directly 
to technology and other nonbank companies, in what could amount to a 
significant reordering of risk management in banking regulation.  There 
is no evidence today that the current regime is somehow inadequate, 
although it is possible that regulators will later determine that 
asymmetries in regulatory treatment between banks and their nonbank 
competitors have become unfair from an operational risk standpoint (e.g., 
if the derivative nature of processing-service regulation grants 
competitive advantages to nonbanks without commensurate regulatory 
benefits) or even from a financial risk standpoint (e.g., if the competitive 
dynamic imperils the value proposition of banks on a wide scale).315 
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At least one possible mechanism for realignment would be to 
broaden the scope of existing banking regulation.  This might result, for 
example, in the targeted application of requirements usually associated 
with banking regulation, such as deposit insurance316 or capital 
requirements, or in broader efforts to bring additional payment providers 
into the bank regulatory framework.317  Nonbanks would presumably 
receive, in exchange, a number of benefits, including the ability to 
provide a broader range of financial services and access to messaging 
and settlement systems.318  This is one of the potential implications of the 
OCC’s proposal to establish a national charter for certain special purpose 
banks, at least if the charter would provide a basis for access to Fedwire 
and other Federal Reserve-operated messaging and settlement services.319 
 
D. Serve as a Catalyst of Innovation to Correct Market Coordination 
Problems 
Financial regulators and market participants have shared incentives 
to make at least some type of payments faster, cheaper, and more secure.  
But the fragmented nature of the payments market has made coordination 
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among stakeholders difficult.320  This coordination problem may present 
opportunities for regulators to serve as catalysts for innovation. 
From 2015 through 2017, the Federal Reserve’s Faster Payments 
Task Force engaged in one such effort, working with a wide range of 
stakeholders to “identify and assess . . . approaches for implementing 
safe, ubiquitous, faster payments capabilities in the United States.”321  
The Task Force issued final recommendations ranging from the 
relatively modest (such as a proposed expansion in the operating hours of 
the Federal Reserve’s messaging and settlement services)322 to the 
ambitious (such as a governance framework and rules for faster 
payments and other new payment services).323 
The Task Force also solicited proposals from stakeholders for real-
time payment systems.  One of the proposals—for The Clearing House’s 
Retail RTP service—was implemented in late 2017,324 although the real-
world consequences of other private-sector proposals and of the Task 
Force’s recommendations remain unclear. 
E. Foster Innovation in Low-Risk Activities 
When financial change in payments does warrant a regulatory 
response, regulators may also have the opportunity to reduce the 
compliance burden on certain technologies or business models through a 
“regulatory sandbox” approach.  Financial regulators around the globe 
are racing to highlight their willingness to consider tailored or reduced 
regulatory requirements for potential innovations across financial 
services.  The most prudent of these approaches are typically limited to 
                                                            
 320.   See Our Process, FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE https://fasterpaymentstaskforce.org/ 
meet-the-task-force/our-process/ [https://perma.cc/5JFH-TGXF] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 321.   About the Faster Payments Task Force, FEDPAYMENTS IMPROVEMENT, https://fedpay 
mentsimprovement.org/faster-payments/about-the-task-force/ [https://perma.cc/GJ6J-MT3F] (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 322.   See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 31, 33, 41. 
 323.   See id. at 35–38.  At the time of publication, the Federal Reserve Board was seeking public 
comment on potential actions to improve payment settlement, including the development by the 
Federal Reserve Banks of “a service for 24x7x365 real-time interbank settlement of faster 
payments” or “a liquidity management tool that would enable transfers between Federal Reserve 
accounts on a 24x7x365 basis to support services for real-time interbank settlement of faster 
payments.”  FED. RESERVE BD., POTENTIAL FEDERAL RESERVE ACTIONS TO SUPPORT INTERBANK 
SETTLEMENT OF FASTER PAYMENTS, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 1, 1 (2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/other20181003a1.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/N5FN-VCAM]. 
 324.   See THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS CO. L.L.C. & FIS, PROPOSAL TO FASTER 
PAYMENTS TASK FORCE (2016), https://fasterpaymentstaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/tch-fis-
vs.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX8S-F3GN]; see also supra Sections II.E, II.F. 
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circumstances where there is uncertainty as to whether existing 
regulation can neatly apply to a potentially innovative technology or 
business model, the activity does not appear to alter the risk profile of the 
service, and the activity has not reached significant market penetration.325 
Beyond assessing the relative risk profile of a potential innovation, it 
is also important to consider the effects that any new regulatory 
distinction may have on the competitive landscape.  Sandboxes would 
seem most effective, for example, where they promote incentives that 
support stable business models of both new entrants and incumbents326 or 
where diversification otherwise improves financial system resiliency.327  
They may have unintended consequences, however, if they artificially 
lower the compliance burden for some but not all suppliers328 without 
any associated regulatory benefit, leading to regulatory escape and 
worsening regulatory outcomes.  For that reason, regulators should 
consider whether a generally applicable change in regulation—rather 
than reduced compliance burdens for some—is more appropriate. 
F. Leverage Financial Change that Reinforces Regulatory Objectives 
The last potential regulatory strategy considered in this Article, one 
that is likely available across the payment stack, is to leverage aspects of 
financial change that may improve regulators’ ability to uphold their 
regulatory and supervisory mandates.  Opportunities to leverage the 
enhanced transparency of certain technologies could prove particularly 
valuable.  That enhanced transparency may improve the ability of 
regulators to perform their duties and reduce information asymmetries 
among market participants.329 
With the vast amount of data that is now transferred, processed, and 
stored in order to send and receive payments and to provide other 
financial services, regulators today face significant questions with 
respect to the collection and analysis of regulation-relevant information.  
                                                            
 325.   See BIS/CPSS, INNOVATIONS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 6, at 53 (“As innovations 
tend to be small at the outset and may not go beyond a pilot phase, it can be difficult for central 
banks to assess a priori the potential of new products or processes as a basis for deciding on work 
priorities.”); id. at 55 (“Another challenge is to determine when to apply oversight or regulations to a 
particular innovation.  If applied too early, oversight might choke off innovation; if applied too late, 
it may subject the system to the related risks.”); Bradley, supra note 248, at 85–89 (discussing 
“sandboxes” as a regulatory approach). 
 326.   See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 13. 
 327.   See id. at 13, 16–17. 
 328.   See BIS/CPMI, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
 329.   See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 13. 
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What information is relevant to their regulatory mandates?  When must 
regulated entities provide access to extensive, real-time data, and when 
are summary reports enough?  Who should have primary responsibility 
for analyzing data?  Should regulated entities have that responsibility or 
should they instead provide bulk data to regulators?  And when should 
regulators permit the outsourcing or consolidation of regulatory 
compliance functions to service suppliers in the processing layer of the 
payment stack? 
The case of law enforcement regulation in payment services is 
illustrative in sorting through these types of emerging questions and the 
potential benefits of technology in achieving regulatory objectives.  
Today, when it comes to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism 
financing compliance, account service providers have primary 
responsibility for analysis of bulk data.330  Market participants have 
argued, however, that in some circumstances account providers should 
be able to engage processing service suppliers to collect customer 
information as part of their customer identification and due diligence 
programs.331  These “compliance utilities” would collect and store 
customer due diligence information in a shared repository, to facilitate 
compliance with law enforcement regulation.332 
Market participants have also suggested that regulators should allow 
account service providers in the third layer of the payment stack to 
provide bulk data on suspicious activity to regulators rather than 
expending resources on creating summaries of that data.333  From a 
regulatory perspective, access to bulk, real-time information would 
require embedding additional expertise within regulatory agencies, the 
development of highly sophisticated surveillance tools, increased 
investment in data analytics resources,334 and a feedback mechanism to 
                                                            
 330.   See, e.g., Letter from Angelena Bradfield, Vice President & Senior Policy Specialist, 
AML/CFT & Prudential Regulation, The Clearing House Ass’n L.L.C. & Richard Foster, Senior 
Vice President and Senior Counsel for Regulatory and Legal Affairs, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury 16 (July 31, 2017) [hereinafter Letter on Review of Regulations], 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/tch/documents/tch-weekly/2017/20170731_joint_trades_ 
comment_letter_to_treasury_on-review_of_regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES8T-6GDY]. 
 331.   See, e.g., id. at 6; THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS CO. L.L.C., A NEW PARADIGM: 
REDESIGNING THE U.S. AML/CFT FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY AND AID LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 19–20 (2017). 
 332.   See COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
CORRESPONDENT BANKING 19–22 (2016) [hereinafter BIS/CPMI, CORRESPONDENT BANKING], 
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d147.pdf [https://perma.cc/57V8-MASD].  A handful of foreign 
governments are developing their own centralized databases to streamline compliance.  See id. at 
29–31.   
 333.   See Letter on Review of Regulations, supra note 330, at 16. 
 334.   See id.; FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 3 (“Supervisors and regulators should 
 
2018 MODELING PAYMENTS REGULATION  147 
correct errors and improve targeting of regulatory-relevant information at 
each payment provider.335 
If this example is representative, regulators may need to consider 
acquiring new expertise and resources as they seek to leverage the 
potentially pro-regulatory benefits of financial change in payment 
services.336 
CONCLUSION 
The payment stack model constructed in this Article has shown that 
payments regulation is largely technology-neutral and activity-based, 
meaning that it is well-placed to adapt to financial change.  Despite the 
pace of financial change in the payments market, the question that faces 
payments regulators is not, then, whether to engage in a wholesale 
rethinking of their approaches but how to focus their resources on fact-
specific strategies.  Going forward, the payment stack model can serve as 
a framework for identifying tailored regulatory responses and blunting 
calls for responses where financial change does not warrant them 
                                                            
consider placing greater emphasis on ensuring they have the adequate resources and skill-sets to deal 
with FinTech.”).  The Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of England have, 
for example, each begun to use data “heat maps” to identify issues of regulatory concern from 
automated analyses of data produced by financial services companies.  See generally INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, FIN. STABILITY BD. & BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE 
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (2016), https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/2016/083116.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CL35-EHZB]. 
 335.   FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 336.   Another instructive example is DLT, which has the potential to enable greater 
transparency, due to the shared nature of a DLT ledger, which means that all copies of a ledger are 
updated in real-time as transactions are validated.  See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 
40, at 44.  Network participants could design DLT ledgers so that they provide financial regulators 
with shared, simultaneous, and automatic access to information necessary to carry out their 
regulatory mandates.  See id.; IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 276, at 59 (“Many DLT 
proponents note that one of the benefits of DLT is that regulators can participate as one of the nodes 
in the DLT, thereby having automated access to all the data.  This in turn would allow regulators to 
have more complete and more traceable, real[-]time records.”).  Or regulators might even become 
gatekeepers to decentralized ledgers, providing connection services in place of or together with 
banks.  Embedding regulators into a DLT network in these ways would essentially write regulation 
into the code of a payment system.  Lawrence Lessig noted this possibility of “code as regulation” in 
1996.  See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1996).  
Implementing these ideas and others like them will quickly give rise to complicated questions, 
however, involving the scope of information sharing and aggregation, appropriate access 
permissions, and compliance with data protection and data privacy rules.  BIS/CPMI, 
CORRESPONDENT BANKING, supra note 332, at 31.  Market participants using a common ledger 
would presumably agree on the type and degree of information to be shared with regulators, with 
respect to each transaction and each customer, taking into account privacy laws and other regulations 
in each jurisdiction in which the DLT network operates.  See Mills et al., supra note 9, at 25.  But 
this could result in the application of the most restrictive regulations across the entire network, 
potentially limiting the usefulness to regulators. 
